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THE REGULATION OF GREEN ADVERTISING:
THE STATE, THE MARKET
AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL GOOD*
DAVID S. COHENt

I. INTRODUCTION
At one time, popular visions of political and economic life were simple.
There was a myth that governments delivered public goods-national
defence, criminal and civil justice, police protection, water and sewage
infiastruture, education, and social welfare services, among othersand the formal instrument employed by governments to do this was
"la\vn--direct
commands of the state backed by its sanctions. There
was, however, a second myth, that the private sector was delivering
private goods-automobiles, consumer durables, chemicals, food products, capital equipment, among others. The instrument employed by
the private sector to deliver these goods was the market and its aggregate
of capital managed by corporate managers. Life was good, or, at least, it
was simple.'
About IOO years or so ago, depending on where one looks and how
one wants to differentiate the private sphere from the public, it can be
said that governments in Canada began delivering private goods as
* I would like to thank Brian Cheffins, Murray Rankin and Catherine Davergne for their
comments on earlier dmfcs. As well, I would like to thank Paul Fairweatherand Alison Taylor for
their invaluable assistance in writing this paper. Without their ener and stimulating critique
the pa er would not have been written. In particular, I would like to
both of them for their
contri ution to the discussion o f preference shaping and propaganda" in Part 6 of this paper. It
is my sincere hope that they will pursue the ideas there expressed. Of course, any errors are my
responsibility.
t Professor David Cohen, Facul of Law, University of British Columbia. The author is a
member of the Advisory Board o the Federal Environmental Choice Program which is discussed
in this aper. All ofthe views expressed in the paper are of the author only, and do not represent
the pobcies of the Environmental Choice Program.
O David Cohen, 1991
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Myths, while necessary, often obscure more than enlighten. Regulatory history demonstrates
that government has involved itself in the regulation of the marketplace and the "private"
sector, particularly as an arbitrator ofconflicting economic interestssince Confederation (see C.
Brown-John, G d i a n Replatog Agencis- (Toronto: Buttenvorths, 1981)at 12).That is, what
we d l private and public is often nothing more than a reflection of what we are comfortable
with at any point in history; or what we believe ought to be the difference between our
individual autonomy and our community identity.
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well-rail transportation2, post-secondary education3, broadcast services: health care,5 among others. This has continued, more or less
without interruption, through to the present day: Air Canada was
established in 1937; the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation in
1946; Petro-Canada in 1974: These are notable examples among the
259 wholly government-owned or effectively government-controlled
enterprises all of which, in their turn, owned or controlled 268 subsidiaries in the mid-1980s.~Governments also began to use a much more
In fact, the first modern American regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
was established in 1887 specifically to oversee and regulate the burgeoning system of ublic and
private railroads in that country (see S. Breyer, Regukztion and In Rrform (~ambrifge,Mass.:
H m d University Press, 1982) at I). The Canadian equivalent, the Board of Railway Commissioners (which is similarly seen as the first modern regulatory agency in this count ), was not
created until 1903. Previous to that time, the regulation of Canadian railroads was andled by
the Railway Committee of the Privy Council (see Economic Council of Canada, TheEmergence
of the Regukztory State in Can&, 1867 - 1939 (C. Baggaley) (1981) at 77-79).
Between 1896 and 1913, the Canadian overnment's current expendimres quadrupled and
developmental pro'ects (railroads and ot er public and commercial avenues of trans ort)
accounted for over half the increase. ~ l m o sall
t the federal debt incurred during the perio was
for railways, canals, harbours and river improvements (ibid at 43).
3 Confederation and the 'oining of Canada by the western provinces in 1867 resulted in the
establishment of a num er of n0.n-denominational state-run institutions of higher learnin
Even rior to that time, the universities in Eastern Canada, most ofwhich were independent y
foungd with religious &liations, were receiving some public monies (seeJoseph Katz, Society,
Schools and Progress in Canah (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1969)).
4 Governments have been involved with the regulation of the airwaves since the first successful
'wireless' broadcasts in the final decade ofthe nineteenth century. Publicly-owned broadcasting
in Canada was begun by the government of Manitoba in 1923 upon the demise of the only two
radio stations in the Province, both of which had been private enterprises. The Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation came into being on z November 1936 with the passing of the
BroadcastingAct (S.C. 1936, c. 24). This formalized the rather loosely formed nenvork of radio
broadcasting extant to that time (see Frank Foster, Broadrating Policy Development ( O t t a w
Franfost Communications Ltd., 1982)).
5 The first public health agencies in'Canada came into bein in the first half of the nineteenth
century to cope with devastating epidemics of communica le diseases, such as the outbreak of
cholera in 1932 which occurred with the arrival of large numbers of Irish immigrants. As the
existing health services were unable to address the large numbers ofsickand dying, the epidemic
spread through the colonies. In 1832-33, the legislatures of Lower Canada, Nova Scoria, New
Brunswick, Upper Canada, and Newfoundland assed legislation establishing local boards of
health to control the outbreak. A central board oPhealth was established in 1849 and more local
boards were formed through the yean leading up to Confederation in 1867. Governments in
Canada have continued to the resent day to rovide services such as communicable disease
control, food and drug controfI maternal anBchild health care, dental health care, health
education services, nutrition services, public health laboratories, and research and statistics.
Public hospitals and, as is well known, programs of publicly subsidized medical insurance have
been provided (see Canada, Royal Commission on Health Services, Report (chair: Justice
Emmett Hall) ( 1964)).
6 Ownership was also used to restructure or revitalize key industries: the Canadian National
Railway in 1919; the Cape Breton Development Co oration in 1967; de HaviUand in 1974;
Canadair in 1976; and Fishery Products ~nternationrand~ a d o n aSea
l Products in the early
1983s (see K. Stein, "Canada's Programme for Privatization" in M. Walker, ed., Privatization:
Tactia and Techniques (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1987) at 70).
7 Allan Tupper and G . Bruce Doern, "Canadian Public Enterprise and Privatization" in k
Tupper and G. Bruce Doern, eds., Public Co~oratiomandPublic Policy in Canah (Montreal:
Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1981) at 7. The authors go on to state that "[tlhe 259
2
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complicated and sophisticated range of regulatory instruments to deliver this expanding set of public benefits.' In particular, governments
started to use markets and independent corporate structures to produce
and allocate at least some of these goods and services? While all of this
was going on, industry continued to deliver their private goods, competing head-on with government enterprise in some cases, in others,
enjoying the comparative simplicity of competing only with other
private-sector actors.
Recently, an increasingly cynical and disappointed public has started
to demand reconsideration of the relative roles of public managers and
private capital. Demands have been made that governments stop trying
to pretend that they can be capitalists. The general inability of governments to operate effectively, the absence of market discipline to constrain and direct public managers, the difficulty in predicting public
demand without markets, the failure of substantive equality ideology to
support non-market intervention, and the fiscal constraints of deficit
financing all have led to neo-conservative strategies. The message, in its
most extreme form, is simple: governments should leave private-sector
activities to the private sector and restrict themselves to producing and
delivering only those goods that the market cannot adequately create

8

parent firms accounted for 2
6
' of the net &xed assets ofall Canadian corporations but less than .
5% of total employment in the economy. They account for over 35% of total government
employment but only about 1696 of total public sector employment (which includes the
education and hospital sectors)."
Governments have a great variety of sanctions, incentives and other tools at their disposal
designed to help achieve their goals. These include the authoricy to spend money; a plication of
threats of physical force (police and prison); initiation of litigation; creation o regulations;
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; criminal sanctions; licensing authoricy which typically
includes the authoricy to suspend or revoke the licence; compensation awards (workers'
compensation boards, for example); and powers ofinvestigation and disclosure (see Stephen G.
Breyer and Richard B. S t e m , Adminimative Law and Reguhtov Policy, (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1985) ar 3-6).
Stein sutes in M. Walker, supra, note 6 at 72 that
Government has at its disposal a number of instruments to implement public policy. Ir can
s end, it can tax, it can legislate and regulate, and it can own. AU of these instruments have
tpeir relative strengths and weaknesses. All have to be carefully assessed and reassessed in
terms of their contribution to national objectives.
Breyer and Stewart discuss direct government provisions ofgoods and services as an administrative function ofmodern governmenr. Traditional e.xamples include the mainrenance of the post
office; the construction ~fpublicworkssuch as highwajrs, dams and navigation improvem;nts;
the provision ofpolice, fire and other protectiveservices; and funding ofpublic education. More
recent additions include mass transit, communications satellite systems, government research
and development programs, public hospitals and ublic housing. There are also a number of
custodial functions carried out by government inc uding the maintenance and administration
of prisons and mental hospitals. In order to carry out these various responsibilities, government
must hire personnel, acquire goods and services, and manage government-owned land and
other resources. These activities are traditionally referred to as
activities (analoous to the activities of private proprietors) as contrasted with
taxation, and other
knctions carried on esclusively or primarily by government
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and distribute, such as a standing military, a criminal justice system and
SO on.
This brings us to what may be the most recent development in the
transformation of regulatory policy-the abdication by the government of what have been viewed traditionally as its appropriate responsibilities of delivering public goods and services. Until recently,
privitization has involved government's returning of responsibility for
delivering private goods to the private sector. This represents a much
more dramatic stage of development. Within government, neoconservatives have argued that if government has done such a poor job
of delivering private goods, perhaps they have done an equally poor job
of delivering public goods. Simultaneously, private enterprise has seen
the opportunity to profit from government divestiture. Why should
penal institutions be public?Why should health care hcilities be public?
Why should water and sewage facilities be public?And, most important
from the perspective of environmentalists, why should environmental
regulation and the delivery of environmental benefits be public?
In this paper I explore this most recent development in regulatory
policy and, in particular, the role government plays when it chooses to
use private markets (consumer, institutional and corporate) as regulatory instruments to produce and allocate environmental benefits. The
privatization of environmental regulation by employing markets to
deliver environmental benefits does not involve the implementation of
public policy through executive or legislative action. Rather, it is
achieved through a public choice to privatize the delivery of environmental regulation by permitting or encouragingdecentralized economic
power to respond to consumer demands for environmental quality."
'0

Privatization of environmental regulation reflects and is the product of several inter-connected
ideas which have come together as we end the twentieth cenrury. First, it reflects one
a plication of the idea popularized by the Bmndtland Commission - that economic
lcisions must integrate environmental considerations. The conce t of "sustainable development" can be used to demand that environmental policy must ref'ect economic imperatives.
This interpretation is attractive ro those who advocate privatization initiatives which can be
justified on the ground that environmental policy, through its allocation to the private sector,
should be integrated with economic policy.
Second, privatization addresses the intractable roblem Faced b public choice theorists that of identifying and measuring demand for pu%licgoods w h i L are not delivered through
market mechanisms. Using markets to deliver environmental quality assumes that there is a
substantial number of individualswho are demanding irn rovements in their local and global
environments, and who win .express that demand in eir economic decisions. The m t
untapped demand for environmental benefits can be harnessed to the dynamically efficient
and creative engine of industry for the benefit of us all. Capital markets, industrial,commodity,
inventory and capital equipment markets, consumer markets and labour markets can all be
exploited to deliver the environmental goods, it is said.
Third, privatization means that the production of environmental policy is measured in
market transactions - investment in waste management firms, increased emplo ment and
thus aggregate income in theenvironmentalsector, investment in research and deve opment to

4
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In Part I of this paper I describe the dramatic transformation during
the past decade in our thinking about the relative place of central
bureaucracies and governments in environmental regulation, and in our
selecting of one or the other to deliver environmental-benefits demanded by citizens as consumers." But that metamorphosis has had as a
catalyst another paradigmatic shift-to the recognition that our traditional conception ofwhat we mean by the environment and its relationship to the market is no longer effective in developing contemporary
public and private environmental policies.
Until recently, popular conceptions of the environment have been
cc
non-economic," which is to say that environmental issues have been
framed as the preservation of rivers, clean ground-water for human
consumption, pristine views, peaceful parklands and so on. Similarly,
the economy has been conceived of in "non-environmental" terms; that
is, economic issues have been framed in terms of employment and
productivity levels, internal rates ofreturn, costs of capital, foreign trade
surpluses, GNP, exchange transaction aggregates and others.
The recent transformation of regulatory theory demonstrates an
integrated image of the economy and the environment. It is not,
however, the simplistic linking of one with the other that characterizes
many discussions of sustainable development. Integration of the economy with the environment means that we must come to understand
these nvo things as one and the same.

1'

develoo orodum and eauioment to address environmental concerns. ourchases of eauioment
designid to reduce envi;oimend impacts in manufacturing, and in=;eased sales of ;odds and
services which generate environmental benefits. Thus privatization of environmental policy
means increased employment in the private sector, initeases in gross national produs, anil
associated measures of economic activity. By contrast, v i d y all other "public' instruments
to which we might resort in order to generate these environmental goods means increased
usation.
Fourth, privatization means that the delivery of the environmental goods is performed by
corporations whose performance is measured by output in market transactions. It means that
we are using mechanisms which incorporate market discipline to control employment and
managerial decision-making, thus taking advantage of the alleged internal efficacy of private
bureaucratic organization. Delivering environmental quality through markets means we
triggercompeti<on am~n~decentraliiidactors
to m a x i m i z e p h t e g a i ~through theselection
of products by consumer and cornorate ourchasers. The comoetition is enhanced throueh the
ability of corI;orate actors to take Hdvanke of regional differekes in demand for envirohentaIyality, and by the ability ofcorporations not only to deliver a fixed order of environmental
qu ity efficiently, bur also to act dynamicallyin developing new methods to address environmental concerns.
Finally, the decision to use markets as a delivery mechanism, while it usually results in
inegalitarian discrimination based on wealth, does not do so in the case of purchase decisions
which are intended to benefit the community at large. The beneficiaries of private market
transactions motivated by environmental concerns are not only the primary purchasers, but
more important, are the unknowable members of the community-who benefit regardless of
assets or income.
As I point out later, one can argue that the behaviour, preferences and values of consumers
acting in markets is not at aII like the behaviour, preferences and values of those same citizens
acting as voters and member of the body politic. See in&
note 39.
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One can depict the world in two ways: either as a static image
representing the current state of the world or as a dynamic image
representing the world in transformation. When one thinks of the
environment, it is as a static image of the collection of its biophysical
resources, comprising human skills and training, both intellectual and
manual; diverse natural resources, including soil, air, water, forest,
mineral, biological; industrial outputs and processes, and a host of
others, some valued in their own right, some valued by reason of their
utility to humankind. When one thinks of the economy, however, it is
as a dynamic image of its institutions, comprising various markets,
capital, product, and service; market players, corporate and personal;
bureaucracies, centrally or decentrally directed; and other^,'^ through all
of which the same collection of biophysical reseources is preserved,
transformed, combined, processed, allocated and then distributed to
corporate entities and human beings.13
The decision to privatize environmental regulation, thereby using the
market to deliver environmental benefits, recognizes that through all of
our personal, professional and corporate decisions we are continuously
creating and transforming the environment. The use of markets to
deliver environmental benefits recognizes that consumers are environmental planners.14
At one level, it does not matter whether we can bring ourselves to
admit the duality of our identities; the failure of our individual and
collective imagination is irrelevant. In purchasing consumer goods for
personal use, capital equipment and supplies for industrial use; in
making choices about inventory sources; and in choosing among alternative sources of inputs for manufacturing processes, purchasers are
making decisions that, individually and collectively, shape and deterOne of my collegues who read this paper pointed out, quite correctly, that this is only a partial
view of the economv and environment. The transformatow apparatus re~resentedbv markets
and command ecoiomies are only a subset of a range df z u r a l tran~format~r~'~rocesses
includin geological, evolutionary, and other physical and biological processes which are
constantb creating new environments.
13 It has been amistake toview the environment and the economy as two se arate entities whether
one says they are related or unrelated to one another. The economy and e environment are not
nvo different things "linked" in the sense that we ought to think of one when we think of the
other. Rather, the econom and the environment are one "thin seen throu h two different
lenses. Thar being so. imprementin environmental olicy sho d not mean t inking that we
which confronts us is not the
must trade one off against the oker. Thus the c!allenge
environment or the economy; it is how we can come to think about the economy and
environment as one.
14 The assumption that an individual can make beneficial environmental choices at the same time
as she is acting as a consumer should raise a number of concerns. I will later discuss at some
length the centralproblemsassociatedwiththis ideaand the difficulties ofattempting to assume
a dual role of this nature.
12

2
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mine the environment.'' That being so, the choice we fice is either to
remain blind to the environmental impact of our market decisions or to
begin to develop processes and systems to inform ourselves of the extent
and nature of that impact, thereby permitting us to make adjustments
consistent with broader societal goals. Consumers can be good environmental planners or poor environmental planners. The fact that such
planning is unpremeditated is irrelevent in considering its environmental consequences.
In Part 111, I offer a number of reasons why we ought to be cautious
before we completely trust markets to act as our most appropriate
regulatory instruments for generating environmental benefits. In particular, I argue that markets that allocate and distribute environmental
quality will likely be dysfunctional, both because of the self-interested
behaviour of producers and because of the incapacity for self-correction
of the market due to informational assymetries and the inability of
purchasers to monitor environmental claims. In Part IV,I explain, by
way of numerous examples of green advertising from the past three
years, how environmental marketing and advertising can be misleading.
I argue in Part V that the state must continue to be implicated in
formulating responses to the dysfunctional character of markets that
hampers their ability to address issues of environmental quality." In
particular, I argue that if markets are employed to deliver environmental
benefits, we will certainly continue to require government involvement
in regulating misleading advertising, and perhaps in developing more
creative and effective solutions to the market dysfunction that may
characterize this form of environmental regulation. But ultimately,
reliance on consumer goods markets to generate environmental benefits
means that we must understand the ways in which we come to think
about the environment.
In Part VI, I suggest that the success of this privitization initiative will
depend, in the end, on individual and collective preferences as they are
manifest in markets. If we are going to use real markets to generate
environmental benefits, we will have to come to terms with our concerns
as citizens and our responsibilities as inhabitants of the world we share.
We cannot blind ourselves to the reality that the ways we think about
global warming, deforestation, incineration at sea, and other ecological
ills is a product of a complicated environmental acculturation process
Again, the language we use to express these ideas is critical. What one should be saying is that
the decisions of purchasers are the environment!
16 Most abstractly, the state permits this form of regulation rather than deploying its available
resources in alternative regulatory endeavours. As well, the market and its associated components contracts, trademark protection and the like, can only o erate if the state, through the
legal system, recognizes and protects contract expecrations an property rights.
15
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that we must be able to describe, evaluate and ultimately shape ifwe are
to survive.

11. T H E TRANSFORMATION O F ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONI7
For the most part, the regulation of industrial and manufacturing
activities that have long- or short-term negative impacts on the natural
environment has been premised on a "command-and-control" model,
that is, governmental sanctionsas prescribed for environmentally harmful behaviour. In the classic sense, command and control means the
establishment of a standard or a rule along with a corresponding
stipulation of a penalty for violation.'* The penalty may be of a quasicriminal nature, whereby the offender is made subject to the criminal
justice system,I9or it may involve ticketing2' administrativepenalties,''
suspension or cancellation of
injunctions or restraining orders" or some combination thereof.
See M. Rankin, "Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: Some Canadian Approaches" (1990) 1Can. J. of Env. and Practice. I am grateful to Professor Rankin for much of
the derail in the following discussion.
The choice of instrument and the setting of thestandards or regulations has not been an "armslength" process:
Traditionally, principles for environmental rotection have been arrived at largely through a
process of negotiation bemeen the r e d t o r s and the regulated industry. Under the
Government Organization Act, 1970 (RS.C. 1970-71. c. 42 as amended by the Government
Oqanization Act, 1979, R.S.C. 1978-79, c. 13) the federal Minister of the Environment was
empowered to initiate and recommend programs to promote the establishment or adoption
of obiectives or standards relating to environmental qualin, or pollution control. The
prim&yagency responsible for this-mandate has been th/~nv&onm;ntal Protection Service
(EPS) of the Department of the Environment.
Constance D. Hunt, H. Ian Roundthwaite, and J. Owen Saunders, "Environment Protection
and Resource Development: Legislation, Policy and Institutions" in B. Sadler, ed., Environmental Protection and Resource Development: Convergence for Today (Calgary: University of
Cdgary Press, 1985) at 12.
19 This generally tends to result in the imposition of fines, although a variety ofsentencing options
are open upon the entering of a conviction. For example, propercy may be forfeited; licences,
permits and other privileges may be suspended or revoked; probation orders may be issued;
restitution and compensation may be ordered; or imprisonment may result. See M. Rankin,
supra, note 17.
20 Various statutes such as the Fisheries Act, (RS.B.C. 1979, c. 137), the Pesticide Control Act,
(RS.B.C. 1979, c. 324, the Wate Management Act, (S.B.C. 1982, c. 41), and the WfdIifeAct,
(S.B.C. 1982, c. 57), call for fines in the order of $roo to $200 for stipulated offenses. Ibid
21 Often called civil penalties, these may be defined as administratively-imposed civil money
penalties that are authorized under a statute. An example of this type of penalty can be found in
the Worken'CompemationAct, (RS.B.C. 1979. c. 437, s. 75) where an assessment may be made
against an employer who allows or creates dangerous working conditions. Ibid
22 This option is provided, for example, in s. 20 of the WaterAct, (RS.B.C. 1979, c. 429). and in
s. 23 of the Wate Management Act.
This remedy enables the Minister to take action in the Supreme Court of a province to prevent
the offender from carrying on activities contrary to statureor the common law. For example, see
s. 24 of the Wate Manaaement Act, which empowers the Minister to seek a restraining order in
respect of certain activzies involving special-wastes. Ibid
17
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Although some commentators have defended the status quo of command and
there is an increasingly vocal and widespread call
for the implementation of new regulatory strategies based on economic
incentives and on greater utilization of the marketplace. Commentators
have noted a number of drawbacks to a command-and-control model:25
the high abatement costs that become incentives to continue polluting
rather than to begin complying with regulations; the lack of incentives
to continue reducing pollution after specific emission standards are met;
the lack of incentives to ensure that industrial or municipal treatment
facilities are operated efficiently and effectively; enforcement delays,
where recalcitrant polluters defer compliance indefinitely through the
use of built-in appeal mechanisms. As well, the injunctions and other
relief granted are not easily adjusted to suit either the severity of the
violation or temporary economic conditions, and the fines that are
levied tend to be counter-productive to the goal of environmental
pr~tection.~'
One can identify a number of alternatives to the traditional regulatory policies, either in place or recommended, in much of North
America. These include surety bonds?' emission and effluent charges?'
transferrable emission
delay penalties and financial incentive
A particularly cogent defence of the current model of regulatory practice can be found in
H. Latin, "Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and
'Fine-Tuning' Regulatory Reforms," (1985) 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1267. The author cites decreased
information collection and evaluation costs, greater accessibilityof decisions to public scrutiny
and participation, increased likelihood that regulation will withstand judicial review, reduced
opportunities for manipulative behaviour by regulated parties, and decreased likelihood of
social dislocation and ' forum sho ping" resulting from competitive disadvantages benveen
geographical regions or between Rrms in regulated industries as advantages of the current
system over those proposed by economists and others. Latin, supra at 1271.
25 See Peat Manvick and Partners, "Economic Incentive Policy Instruments to Implement
Pollution Control Objectives in Ontario" (1983). M. Stone, "Pricing Pollution: Revising
British Columbia's \Vaste Discharge Permit Fees," (Victoria: B.C. Ministry of the Environment, 1990).
26 h,f. Rankin, supra note 17;Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. S t e m , in a reply to Latin,
supra, note 24, "Reforming Environmental Law" (1985) 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333; D.N. Dewees,
"Regulating Environmental Quality" in D.N. Dovees, ed., The Regulation of Quality:Products,
Services, workplace^, and the Environment (Toronto: Bunenvorrhs, 1983) at 149.
27 A polluting firm or municipality would be required to deposit a sum of money with a secure
governmental or private financial institution at the time an abatement rogram is a reed upon.
As the program is completed, the money is rehnded until it is p i d baciin full. ~aifureto meet
deadlines or to achieve the specific results targeted could result in forfeiture of the monies.
2"
comprehensive survey and assessment of the North American and international ex erience
with emission fees is concained in M. Stone, "Pricing Pollution: Revising British Co umbia's
Waste Discharg Permit Fees" (Victoria: B.C. Ministry of the Environment, 1990) at 132. See
also R Hahn, An Evaluation of Options for Reducing Hazardous Waste" (1988) 12 Harv.
Environmental Law Rev. 213.
29 The most~vell
known of the emission tradingprograms now operating is that establishedby the
United States Environmental Protection Agency in the early 1980s. See 4 4 Fed. Reg. 71779
(Dec 11,1979) (Original Bubble Policy) and Revisions to EPA's offjet policy, Fed. Reg. 3274
2.'
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schernes,3O tax incentives?' and other efforts to harness market forces,
such as government procurement policies?' In the end, the array of
economic instruments and other non-coercive governmental programs
available to generate environmental benefits is limited only by the
imagination of the regulator.33
The utilization of the marketplace for the furtherance of the environmentalist agenda offers a number of previously unexplored advantages.
The basic case for the market solution lies in its flexibility:
its ability to guarantee the maximum of environmental improvementfor any
p'vm amountspent on it, or, to view it the other way around, its ability to

guarantee the minimum cost for any given amount of environmental improvement. Analysis of the causes of environmental degradation (or waste of
(January 16,1979); 45 Fed. Reg. ~ 2 6 7 6(August 7,1980) and 51 Fed. Reg. 43814 (Dec. 4,1986)
(Final Emissions Trading Policy). By 1986 the EPA had directly approved or proposed to
approve 50 bubbles, saving users an estimated $3oo,ooo,ooo over the cost of conventional
controls. See Environmental Protection Agency, "Emissions Tradin Status Report," January I,
1986. See generally, R. Hahn and L. ester, "~arketablePermits: ~ f e o r and
y ~ractice,"(1989)
16 Ecology Law Quart. 380.
3 O Under such schemes, emission standards, schedules and deadlines would be established b the
Ministry in the usual manner with prosecutions, fines and the like available. Firms wou d be
liable for predetermined penalties or assessments if they miss deadlines, allowable emission
levels are exceeded or monitoring or reporting requirements are breached.
31 These might include product taxes, as well as modifications to income taxes. See M. Stone,
"Environmental Excise Taxes: Options for British Columbia (Victoria, British Columbia,
Ministry of the Environment, 1990). Arecent Canadian initiative in this area is an amendment
to the Income TmAct, (S.C. 1970-71-72 as amend. c. 63) permitting an accelerated capital cost
allowance for firms that install pollution abatement equipment. This might be extended to
similarly reward changes in a firm's production processes which achieve the same result.
32 A recent government initiative in many jurisdictions is the development of government
procurement policies which demand that suppliers su ply products which are environmentally
preferred as compared to substitutes. One example o government leadership in Canada is the
policy recently adopted by the City ofWinni eg which has developed a procurement policy to
encourage the use ofproducrs "that have the east h a r m l l effect on the environment.. .".See
'"I'he City of Winnipeg Purchasing Policy with Respect to Sustainable Development and
Environmental Issues" (1990).
The Federal government's Green Plan, for all that it has been criticized, includes aclearsignal
to the effect that the Federal Government will develop a Federal Code of Environmental
Stewardship which will, among other things "ensure &at environmental considerations are
integrated into purchasing policies and practices." Canada's G r m Phnfor a Healthy Environmenr, (Government of Canada, 1990) at 163. In the United States under s. 6002 of The Solid
Waste Disposal Act, as amended by the Resource Consemation and Recovny Act (1974,all
purchases exceeding$~o,oooofcertain designated items must contain minimum percentages of
recovered materials. The Environmental Protection Agency has set guidelines for concrete
containing fly ash, lubricating oils, re-refined oil, retread tires, and building insulation
products.
33 The United states Environmental Protection Agency, for example, in addition to adjudicating
violations of environmental legislation, "imposes civil penalties for violation of certain regulatory re uirements; rants and revokes licenses for the marketing and use ofpesticides; monitors
and pu%licizes polktion levels throughout the nation; issues general regulations specifying
re uired pollution-control measures; inspects polluters' records and operations; makes substanti grants for municipal waste-treatment plant construction and for environmental research;
utilizes the environmental impact statement rocess of the National Environmental Policy Act
to influence the environmental policies of o er governmental agencies; and so on. Breyer and
Stewart, supra, note 8 at 6.
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natural resources) is based on what economist have long known in theory,
and have often observed in practice: when individuals have property rights
in a resource, they tend to use it less wastellly than when the resource is held
in common. The foundation of most market-based techniques is to force
users to calculate the social consequences of their use of a common-property
resource by monetizing those consequences and imposing that cost on the
firm, or to create property rights where these would not otherwise exist.34
Even a cursory review of regulatory developments over the past
decade indicates that calls for the privatization of environmental regulation have moved through several stages. The first stage .was the use of
incentives-effluent charges and the like-reflecting, simultaneously,
market ideology and pragmatic instrumentalism. The most recent stage
in this metamorphosis is that of using the markets themselves to deliver
the environmental goods and, in particular, using markets for goods and
services to respond to demands for environmental quality.35

111. T H E PROBLEM WITH MARKETS
The privatization of environmental regulation through the use of markets cannot, however, be taken to be the entire game, and there are a
number of disturbing reasons why such a policy may ultimately fail.
First, there is a certain internal contradiction in a policy that operates
through goods and services markets while attempting to reduce patterns
of producer and consumer consumption.36Specifically, producers wishing to masimize profits can hardly be expected to decrease inputs3'while
purchasers attempting to maximize their utility are being asked to
consume less. There is a necessary contradiction benveen a policy that
Richard G. Lipsey, "Greening b Market or by Command!: Rapporteur's Report and Comments" in G. Bruce Doern, e l , The Enuironmmtal Imperative: Market Approaches to the
Grzening of C a n a h (Toronto: C.D. Hovre Institute, 1990) at 1x8.
35 Such a shift is not discernible in any governmental programs, policies or regulatory schemes.
The lack of such intervention is, of course, further evidence that governmental will is manifest
in allowing the consuming public to determine the amount of environmental benefit through
the marketplace. This idea is further reinforced by the massive expansion in 'enviro-marketing'
practices by private enterprise, and the level of success which they are ex eriencing.
This is not to suggest that there is no further place for governmentafregulation. Strict
standards may often fbster competitiveness by encouraging com anies to re-engineer their
technology. The result in many cases is aprocess which not only PO utes less but lowers costs or
improves quality. See Michael E. Porter, 'Essay:America's Green Strategy" ScientijicAmerican,
(April 1991)at 16s.
3" I discuss the use of the market as a regulatory instrument to reduce demand for environmentally
costly products in Part VI.
37 Of course, I am assuming a static scientific and technological environment within which the
producers operate. T o the estent that research and development produce information and
technology which permit producers to simultaneously increase outputs and decrease inputs,
they mill do so.
3.1
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must minimize resource demands and pollution emissions, and that
simultaneously attempts to employ an instrument, such the market, in
which the relevant actors will often be attempting to increase sales and
market share. So long as companies seek to maximize their profits, it is
problematic to expect consumers to minimize their consumption. Put
another way, although corporate actors will seek to minimize inputs,
they will do so only insofir as they can maximize profits while maximizing their outputs-outputs that are themselves dynamic measures of
consumer demand, production and sales. Environmental regulation
may very well require a reduction in outputs-a reduction in consumption and use by the public that corporate actors will certainly oppose.
Thus, we cannot rely on producers to effect the necessary reduction in
inputs and consumption given that they themselves are major consumers (and so must they be in order to continue to pr~duce).~'
A further explication of this point involves something of a syllogism.
If a corporate entity states that it is reducing and conserving, consuming
less in the manufacture of its finished product and by so doing supporting a reduction in the depletion of resources, it is in fact reducingcosts,
all of which is in its own best interests as a producer. Given a strong
market for its environmentally beneficial products, the same producer
will ultimately increase inputs as its sales increase. At the same time,
when the consumer expends effort to consume less, this reduced consumption may well be good for the environment but, by clear extension,
bad for the producer.
A further problem impinging on the success of environmental regulation involves the recognition that people assume different attitudes,
beliefs, values and expectations as they assume different roles appropriate to different situations. Sagoff argues:
As a citizen, I am concerned with the public interest, rather than my own
interest; with the good of the community, rather than simply the well-being
of my family. ..In my role as a consumer, ...I concern myselfwith personal
or self-regardingwants and interests;I pursue the goals as an individual. I put
aside the community-regarding values I take seriouslyas a citizen, and I look
out for Number One instead. I act upon those preferences on which my
personal welfare depends; I may ignore the values that are mine only insoh
as I consider myself a member of the community, that is, as one of
38

39

The point was made forcellly, if inadvertently,by the President ofMcDondd's who said that,
"[ilf a decision will help us sell one more hamburger, I'm willing to make that decision. See J.
Blount, "Battle of the Clamshells" Report on Business (April 1991) 41.
Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth; Philosoply, L w , and the Environment (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988) at 8.
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Thus we have another paradox, that of citizens' and consumers'
calling for increased governmental regulation of corporate polluters, all
the while consuming and discarding inordinate amounts of goods in
their daily lives. Or that of voters' electing to office the "environmentally friendly" political candidate, having acted true to their values in
their role as citizens, all the while continuing to waste resources in their
roles as consumers. This inherent and unavoidable inconsistency over
both the short- and long-term reduces the possible success of any
market-based environmental regulation in isolation. As Sagoff notes,
and as I deal with in greater detail in Part Vl, "these problems are
primarily moral, aesthetic, cultural, and political and ... they must be
addressed in those terms."*O
Markets might also fail if there are substantial numbers of opportunistic free-riders who, while gaining from the environmentallyappropriate choices of others, themselves still refuse to make the personal
sacrifices required of them to allo\v the market to determine the amount
of environmental benefit!' Moreover, product markets alone cannot be
expected to monitor environmental behaviour because they operate in
conjunction with capital markets that may or may not be operating
according to an environmental agenda, or that at least may be responding to tastes different from those driving consumer-goods m ~ k e t s . 4 ~
Nor do consumer-goods markets operate independently of organized
labour. The latter might be expected to oppose policies that result in

"1

Zbid at 6. I should point out, however, that recognizing that individuals might have different
preferences depending on the context in which they are making choices does not depend upon
&a argument that in o i e case the are altruistic and-in another &If-interested. ath he;, xvhat6ver
they are, they are different in &fferent roles.
This dilemma may verywell result in the disintegration of the market. What is required here is a
dramatic change in ethics -the reputation of free-riders must be such as to pressure them to
bear social costs at least equivalent to the environmental costs of their decisions.
The public at large may not be represented in capital markets and the taste of investors for
environmend quality might be significantlydifferent than that ofa broadercross-section ofrhe
community.
if it were no; investo; preferences must necessarily be filtered throu h
institutional agents such as ension h d managers and mutual fund managers who filter k e
preferences oftheir principJ and, thus, necessarilyhave to put their own interpretations on the
environmental demands of their investors. More important, there is the popularly held view
that corporations should only act according to economic imperatives, leaving it to shareholders
to use the profits from that activity in any way they see fir. The argument is that managers know
only that investors demand the maximization of income streams, and any other demand must
be espressed individually not collectivel Equally imporrant is the knowledge that many
investors and managers are influenced y short term profits, while choices which reflect
environmental values are often associated with uncertain rofits which, if generated at all, will
be received at some unknown future date. Finally, in ormation about a particular firm's
environmental behaviour is complex, not generally known, and cannot be determined without
a substantial investment of resources and the introduction of highly subjective interpretations
by investment firms.
However. caoital markets will resoond to exoected income streams. If consumer markets are,
;~
ireferred ;oducts, capital markets should follow, and firm;
in kct, h r ~ l r i r environmentally
which are successful in the former should Rnd their cost of capital both in equiry and debt
markets decreasing.

en
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substantial shifts in market shares and fluctuations in unemployment
levels across ind~stries.4~
Markets also fail to take into account demand
for environmental quality from the impoverished populace of the present and future whose interests-except to the extent that they are
actually reflected, if at all, in the decisions of current market
participants-are under-represented in m ~ k e t s . 4 ~
Finally, and most importantly in the immediate context, sound use of
markets is put at risk by the self-interested, non-social-welfare maximizing behaviour ofproducers who may, innocently or deliberately, exploit
both the ignorance of the public and the transaction costs of the market
to their own advantage. Professor Arthur LeK showing brilliant if not
prophetic insight in his book S~indLin~andSeIZing,~~
described what is
going on here as a "God con." Phenomenal profits are available to those
who can sell environmental salvation at practically any price to consumers, who will gladly pay. Deep concerns about the environment and
the opportunity to save oneself and the world are intoxicating inducements to many of us. They offer artists the outrageous opportunity to
sell something to buyers who cannot possibly discover that they have
been conned until it is too late to do much about it. What is especially
disturbing about the environmental congame, is that like the "God
con," the environmental con permits opportunists not simply to exploit
consumers' private greed but also to profit from other-regarding mo43

Aquite well known example of the opposition by organized labour markets to shifrs in demand
associated with environmental concerns is the experience of Lily Cups with the shifi by
McDonald's restaurants from polystyrene clamshells to waxed paper. Repom su est that Lily
Cups was forced to lay off between 35 and 46 people, representing 8 10% of its st% because of
the change in demand by McDonald's. See J. Blount, nr ra, note 38; see also V. Gault,
"Casualties of the Environmental Wars," GIobe and ail 4 3 February I 991) Dz.
The shifi in demand sets up the well-known confrontation between organized labour and
environmentalists which is played out not only in forests but also in consumer markets. For
example, the Graphic Communication International Union which represents employees in the
olystyrene industry states that the 10,ooo workers in that industrial sector feel insecure and are
'scared that the public backlash against
polystyrene might mushroom into the rest of the
.~~
business." (V. G a d t at Dz.)

-

employment transferaboth personally and politically more $atable m d t be developed ro
counteract the asymmetry. One example of a rivate cor orate transition strategy is the case of
Lily Cups and McDonald's who together supsidized jo!-search
counselling and termination
pay beyond contractual requirements when some 3~-40emplo ees of Lily Cups were ermanently displaced as a result of McDonald's decision to shift om polystyrene clams ells to
waxed paper. (V. Gault at D2.)
One might find thatwealthier consumersmay be moresensitive to environmental risks than are
poorer consumers. Thus, their tastes would be over-represented in markets for environmentally
sensitive rodum. However, they may purchase more, ossibly more than offsetting their
demand g r environmental uality on a per item basis y increased consumption and the
commensurate environmen costs.
A. LeE, Swindling and Selling (New York: The Free Press, 1976) at 56-88.
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tives, those altruistic concerns for one's community, future generations
and the planet.""
What Leff recognizes as operative in all markets, including markets in
environmental goods, is the immediately recognizable self-interest of
suppliers when they "sell the environment":
The green movement is seen by some as an ideal opportunity to market all
sorts of products that carry an environmentally sound claim but in fact may
be bogus. Salesmen and consultants will line up outside your door to offer
you everything from environmentallysound pencils to plastic wrap to waste
a~dits.4~
Misleading advertising harms more than just the individual who
mistakenly purchases a product or service unaware of its real environmental characteristics. Of far greater concern, however, is that misinformation may generate considerable harmful cynicism about all
environmental claims, including responsible ones. This cynicism, captured by the truism that "bad money drives out good," detracts from the
benefits of private-market and government initiatives that attempt to
use market and purchaser preferences to generate environmental benefits to be enjoyed by the public at large, to effect an environmental good.
The quite understandable inability to distinguish accurate information
from misleading information means that most if not all such information could be discounted by purchasers, substantially reducing the
expected return on othenvise desirable investments in research and
development, product design and packaging, transportation systems,
and other areas."' Distrust of such information, without regard to its
accuracy, creates a situation that is fundamentally worse than the fraud
or theft resulting from misleading or inaccurate claims about the nonenvironmental attributes of products. Because the very point of the
46

Of course, it may be possible that businesses would disclose the misleadin information
disseminated by dishonest competitors. However, that has not been acommon pltenomenon in
advertisin in eneral.Aswel1, ifconsumerscannor affirm the accuracy ofany claims, onewould
have to as w y they would they chose to believe the "honest" competitor.
B. Fleming, "Reducing Environmental Impacts and Creating Environmentally Preferred
Producrs," (4th Annual Purchasing Management Conference, "Institute for International
Research," 26 February 1991) at 8. (Paper on file at the University of British Columbia.) There
have been several notable examples of alleged private exploitation of consumer demand for
environmentally sensitive products. I describe numerous examples of these in the paragraphs
below. Others are contained in "Time to Regulate the Environmental Bandwagon," Ottawa
Bwiness News (12 August 1989) 9.
A recent survey of 1,400 shoppers in Britain indicated that 56% of those surveyed are now
suspiciousof claims that products are environmentally friendly, up from 43% the previous year.
Furthermore, the proporrion of people who said they werelviuing to buy green products even if
such products underperform conventional alternatives had dropped from 24% to 18%. See
"Friendly to \Whom!" (7 April 1990) The Economist 83.

\ k

fl

Heinonline - - 25 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 239 1991

240

U.B.C.

LAW REVIEW

19Y1

green-advertising exercise is to ensure that environmental information
is available for consumer use, consumer distrust of that information will
ultimately result in the collapse ofany market system designed to supply
it.
The problem of market dyshction is exacerbated by the fact that
purchasers acting as environmental planners cannot test the veracity of
the information disseminated by market actors; environmental claims,
unlike virtually all other product claims, are not subject to empirical
testing by the consumer. We are all familiar with the two basic approaches to product information verification, namely search and experience. Product quality and performance-durability, servicing costs,
output levels, "fit" with existing systems and products, toxicity, weight,
tensile strength among others-can be and often are tested and rated
through the purchaser's experience with the product. While not necessarily the best method to ensure that one's expectations are met, it is at
least, available to purchasers. Conversely, many if not most environmental characteristics-preservation of bio-diversity, reduction of
ground-water toxicity and carbon emissions, among others-are not,
and might never be, verifiable through product end-use. The impossibility of verifying environmental claims creates incentives for producers to supply misinformation; the necessity of independent prepurchase claims verification therefore, is increasing in urgency and
importance.
The claims verification problem is far more serious than might first
appear. It is obvious that the use of inaccurate or incomplete environmental information to influence purchasing decisions represents a coerced transfer of wealth from purchasers to suppliers. Purchasers whose
expectations of environmental benefits are not fulfilled are being deprived of wealth non-consensually, given that their consent to the
purchase was obtained as a result of misleading information about the
environmental characteristics of the products purchased. But individualized losses represent only the most trivial of problems in light of the
systemic market and environmental consequences of misleading advertising. The comparative inability of consumers to verify environmental
claims means, unfortunately, that the immediate results of using environmental products and adjusting life-styles so as to reflect that interest
and of "doing one's bit for the planet" although manifest are not readily
realizable. In fact, the beneficial results of large numbers of consumers
changing their behaviours may not be evident even within those consumers' lifetimes. Given that fact, a distrustful public with no way of
verifying environmental benefit claims may be prone to ignore even
those that are legitimately made and to continue to use those products
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that give the best immediate results, irrespective of their environmental
value, in their quests to get clothes whiter, dishes cleaner, and infants
diapered more conveniently, all the while producing increasingly irremedial environmental degradation.
In Part IV,I explore in detail the market &lure associated with
information asymmetries i n consumer markets and the exploitation of
consumer ignorance by producers who market goods based o n
environment-related information.

IV. EXPLOITING ALTRUISM: THE PHENOMENON OF
GREEN ADVERTISING
Deciding how we should respond to the risks of the environmental con
game and the systemic environmental degradation that it produces must
begin with an appreciation of the subtlety and rhetoric of "green
advertising." T h e following discussion represents a brief analysis of
several ways in which environmental claims might be less than accurate,
and thus illustrates the complex problem that one must address i n
designing systems to respond to this phenomenon:
I.

Some information about environmental characteristics-although it is
impossible to know what percentage-might be explicitly inaccurate.
While one suspects that this may be the case in only a small proportion of
claims, one will still come across claims that a product is "CFC free"
when in fact, it is manufactured using CFCs. Or a product said to be made
from "recycled" fibre is made from virgin fibre. One can find examples of
products that are described as "non-polluting" but that are disposableand
that use an ozone-depleting substance in their manufacture.

2.

Some claims are intentionally vague, and thus subject to considerable
misinterpretation; for example, one can point to numerous claims that a
product is "environmentally friendly" or "environmentally responsible."
The kinds of misinterpretation generated by these claims are quite
complicated. At best, the product represents some reduced risk to the
environment as compared to one alternative elected by the producer. It
may also be, however, that the product does not represent a reduced
environmental risk compared even to that alternative. And more important, the product will almost always notrepresent a reduced environmental risk as compared to another alternative. One can be certain therefore
that the product does not present an environmental benefit.49

@ ' I t might be said that any label which makes reference to the environmentwill place the

roduct
in the "good" cateeorv.
, Plastic bottles of Lever Brothers' oroducts such as Wisk and carrv a
label wfich says "support plastic recycling". The corn an;, in another label on the back, staies
that it is now' using technology that can include recyc ed plastic in our bottles at levels benveen
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3. Some environmental claims, while not explicitly inaccurate, represent
implicitly inaccurate information where, for example, they provide irrelevant but still misleading information. One might read claims that a
product is "CFC free." But if that claim is made in respect of a product
that was never made with CFCs, one has to ask what h e motive for the
claim was. One concern about this kind of claim is that it generates an
inference from the "CFC free" statement that the product was previously
made with CFCs and thus that the manufacturer has voluntarily taken
steps to improve the environment, where no such steps had ever been
taken? or perhaps where legislation made it mandatory to effect the
change.$'
4. A variant on this kind of implicitly inaccurate information occurs when

suppliers provide accurate information that is misleading because of
purchasers' unsophisticated knowledge of environmental risks. A product
may be represented, for example, either through words or images, to be
"CFC free" when in fact the product contains HCFCs. Here the statement leads to an inference that the product has no ozone-depleting
characteristics, when it does, albeit of a type that is less damaging than
that which it repla~ed.~'
5. A further variant on the implicitly inaccurate information situation is
presented by claims which while facially accurate, omit pertinent environmental information. A supplier, for example, may represent that a
product is "CFC free" where the product uses pentane or another

$0

z<%and ?s%." Yet nowhere does it state whether anv recvcled olastic is actuallv used in the
containe&d company officials have admitted that idividud bdttles may or ma; not contain
recycled plastic. See "Coming Clean on Products: Ecological
- Claims Faulted" The New York
Times (I; March 1991) CI. Eveready Canada Inc. recently backed down from a claim of "environmentally friendly" for
its alkaline banetv and has reolaced it with "environmentallv safer." The original
claim was
u
based on the Facithat mercu& content had been reduced i n the bane by some 90%. The
switch was made when environmentalists and some competitors (incluxng Duracell Canada
Inc., which had also reduced mercury content in their product although not to the same extent)
complained that no battery could be described as environmentally friendly. Alkaline batteries
contain heavy metals such as manganese and cadmium that could leak from landfill sites and
contaminate drinkingwater. Some batteries also produce only 2% of the energy that went into
making them. See "Consumer Update - Green Power" (March 1990) Canadian Consumer 6.
A similar strategy was demonstrated when an automobile manuFacturer in Britain recently
advertised one of its cars as being "as ozone-friendly as it is economical" because it runs on
oline. As was pointed out in the article describing the advertisement, "lead may be
bad for t e bmn,
- but nobody blames i t for holes in the ozone layer." See supra, note 4.
The claim of "CFC free" is a particularly pervasive example of this type of advertising. Many
aerosol products make the claim that they use no CFG. In Fact, the use o f C F G in aerosol spray
cans has been banned in Canada since 1980 due to the damage they do to the ozone layer. T o
make a claim that one is not using a substance that has been prohibited for eleven years seems
somewhat self-righteously advantageous, at the least.
HCFC-22 (or Formacel-S, the registered product name of a product distributed by Du Pont
Canada Inc.) is not as inert as CFC and tends to break up in the lower aunos here where its
component chlorides can still be washed down by precipitation. It is, over its li etime, only ~ ? b
as destructive as CFC, which can be viewed as a 95% reduction in ozone depletion or as a 596
increase once CFC is gone. It is not benign. See "Earthly Goods" Uuly 1990) Canadian
Consumer 14.
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foaming agent. The problematic inference from the statement presented
is that the product presents no environmental risks in light of the
displacement of CFCs. In fact, the product does present a range of
environmental risks, including depletion of non-renewable resources,
and costs, including energy, solid waste disposal and hydro-carbon emission costs.53

6. Still another variant within this implicitly inaccurate information category is a product claim that the lay public might interpret as an environmental benefit, but where there is considerable evidence that the product
represents an environmental cost. Perhaps the most notorious example of
this involves claims of biodegradability. The problem is that two inferences from that word may not be true, the first inference being that
biodegradation occurs. In fact, there are many who would argue that
biodegradation may not occur in practice given the absence of light and/
or air in l a n d f i l l ~ . ~ q hsecond
e
inference from the statement is that
biodegradability is beneficial to the environment. But that benefit may be
more apparent than real. Recent evidence suggest that the environmental
character of degradable products depends on the by-products of degradation, some of which may represent serious environmental risks.55MoreThis is an example of the situation where the maker of the statement fails to take into account
the environmental costs associated with a substitute component or design. In other words,
product life-cycle environmental impact assessment involves relative assessments of alternative
product designs and production processes, not simply an assessment of an individual variable
associated with a particular component or rocess. Pentane, for example, contains no chlorine
and will like1 degrade into its component ydrocarbons in the lower atmosphere. However, it
is itself a vo atile o r p i c compound and, in large quantities, may be a component in the
formation of smog.
5"or
e m le, the Mobil Chemical Company recently sealed out of court a lawsuit brought
against it sis states, led by the Arrorney General of New York The suit alleged that claims of
degradability made by the company regarding its plastic trash ba s were fake and misleading.
The company agreed to pay a total of $ ~ p , o o oand to stop m&ng the claim that the bags
would photodegrade when used and disposed of in an ordinary manner. The suit contended
that the bags simply ended up in landfills. See "Mobil Senles on Hefty Bags" New Yurk Times
(28 June 1991) Dq.
55 A recent study indicates that many so called degradable products including sandwich bags,
plastic egg cartons and disposable food containers decompose merely into smaller pieces of
plastic. See "New Smdy Challenges 'Biodegradable' Claims" New York Times (r March 1991)
B7."Biodegradability" clearly implies a reduction of solids into organic matter through a
biological process. Plastic is a non-organic synthetic, not a biological substance, and therefore
cannot de rade inm organic matter. Furthermore, to degrade something, micro-ot$nisms
must be a le to digest or wet it. Micro-organisms cannot wet plastic. At best, ey can
disintegrate it into plastic dust over an indeterminate period of time.
Recently, starches have been added to the plastic which manuhcturers claim will enable the
product to breakdown. Scientistshave pointed out that this is Fallacious. Micro-organisms need
air, somethin they will not find in landfill sites, to bredc substances down and anaerobic
bacteria, whi do not require
degrade polyethylene. The
added starch, but not the
Finally, some argue that
in a landfill. Rotting or
decayin material can
that a dump be a
tomb w ere things remain inert.
Most major retailers in Canada have stopped using biode radable plastic checkout bags.
Shoppers Drug Mart recently announced that they would nojonger be selling biodegradable
53
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over, the introduction of degradable plastics into the solid waste stream
may have signficant adverse environmental impacts if one recognizes the
impact of contaminated inputs on plastic recycling programs.
7. A slightly different example of implicitly inaccurate information consists
of a claim that has not been empirically verified. One can claim, for
example, that a product is "phosphate free" or that it is "recyclable." The
problem here is that this is a single-component environmental adjustment in a situation where a net environmental benefit may not be
demonstrable, because of pre-existing environmental costs, because a
substitute design was utilized, or because in practice such products are not
recycled given current recycling infrastructure^.^"

8. A more complicated example of the problem involves information about
a product reformulation that generates a reduced risk to the environment.
The representation appears to be accurate but ignores other environmental risks. One might imagine, for example, a situation where a claim of
"phosphate free" is made for a product that is free of phosphate, and
where the subtitute component is environmentally benign. Such a claim,
however, may still represent a single-component environmental adjustment with a marginal environmental improvement, at the same time
generating a significant shift in market share or price without a
correspondingly significant improvement in environmental quality. The
difficulty here is that purchasers (and for that matter governmental
regulators) are unable to quantitativelyassess the environmentalimprovement, given its marginal nature and the time-span over which the
improvement will take place. This inability may mean that the purchaser
is paying too much for the impr~vement.~~
garbage ba s when their current supplies run out on the basis that they "don't really make a
valid conttgution to the environment." See "Earthly Goods" (July 1990) Canadian Consumer
12.

See also L.R Krupp, "The Biodegradability of Modified Plastic Films in Controlled
Biological Environments" (Masters Thesis, Cornell University, 1991) [unpublished].
56 The concern about recyclability being misleading because of the fact that the infrastrucrurefor
recyclin is not in place is in pan the reason behind the public concern about McDonald's
claims &at its polystyrene containers were recyclable. While there were pilot collection
programs in place in limited locations, the vast majority of polystyrene was not, in fact, bein
recycled. Furthermore, even if polystyrene was bein collected, it was not evident that it woul
be economically recycled into new products. Fin y, a substantial portion of the polystyrene
used in McDonald's restaurants is removed fiom the premises by the consumer and, thus, does
not enter the recycling stream. Other concerns about recyclability claims involve omittin
information about the continuing emission problems surrounding polystyrene production an
omitting information about the use of hydrochlorofluorocarbons(HCFC's) to replace chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's) in the manuhcturing process. See J. Blount, supra, note 38.
57 Another aspect of the same phenomenon is the addition of environmental claims to items which
tander to aspecific audience and, perhaps, tend to add a note of forgiveness to the modern sin of
conspicuous consumption." TheTerraVerde Trading Co., for example, markets toasters that
the store sa are made to last a lifetime. Part of the display includes a label which reads, "Eve
appliance
can be fixed is one less iece ofjunkin the landfill." o he toasters cost $240 (u.s~
for a nvo-slicer and $320 (U.S.) for a Pour-slicer, aseemin ly high price to pay for even a lifetime
of toast. See "Environmentally Yours" (17 March 1998 New York Times Magazine 70.
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9. The final example of implicit inaccurate information is that of image

advertising. Here we see that a company is concerned about the environment through representations in music, general philosophical positioning, colour, and words. It is impossible, however, to know whether the
entire corporate activity is generating environmental benefits or even
reducing environmental risks, and one has a very red suspicion that the
reality might be quite different from how it has been p~rtrayed.~'
Since this brief narrative description of "green marketing" cannot
possibly convey the same power of the fdl range of visual and sensory
images now employed to persuade consumers to base their purchase
decisions, at least in part, on environmental concern^.^' But it does
confirm that markets in "green information" are not yet perfect and will
not likely develop to perfection for several reasons. First, we will never
eliminate the self-interest of suppliers who are making these claims.
Second, purchasers, except in the context of the most substantial purchase decisions, cannot make the required investments in research and
analysis to assess the information and thus monitor and correct supplier
misinformation. Third, the scientific and technical environmental data
on which the claims are made are rapidly evolving, increasing the
likelihood of even well-intentioned suppliers' making substantial errors
in environmental impact assessment and biasing the information they
disseminate in turn to pur~hasers.'~
The obvious risks associated with these purely private environmental
marketing claims have led to a number of initiatives, both public and
private, aimed at assisting in the development of more accurate, com58

5'

"

The continuing efforts of major manufacturers to enhance the image of disposable diapers is a
well-known esample of this phenomenon. One advertisement which was widely criticized by
environmentalists showed the life cycle of a disposable diaper based on the 80% compostable
materials that went into its manufacture. In graphic represenration, the diaper is shown
disintegrating in a composting process until, in the final event, a sapling is shown sprouting
from the soil lek from the decomposed dia~er.As one environmentalist commented, trees do
not grow from diapers! See Alecia Swasy, P&G Gets M i e d Markets as It Promotes Green
Image but Tries to Shield Brands" Wall Street J o u m l ( 2 6 August 1991) BI.
As I noted earlier, however, there is a real risk that all information will be discounted if
consumers become cyncical about the veracity of the information and are unable to verify its
accuracy. See supra, note 46.
Another problem with ensuring accuracy in environmentally related advertisin which I
discuss in detail in Part 6, is that the environmental objectives and preferences o numerous
purchasers cannot beex ected to be identical. Suppliersatein theunenviableposition ofhaving
to supply environmenc lproduct information to purchasers who are not uniformly interested in
the same kind of information. Even if they are interested, they may react in radically different
ways to the same dam.

F'
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parable and verifiable environmental information to be made available
to purchasers. I will briefly review some of the more important responses
to the kinds of marketing activities described above.

V. REGULATORY RESPONSES TO ENVIRONMENTXL
CLAIMS
There are two obvious roles for the state in a world where private
markets are employed to deliver environmental benefits.6' The first is to
create new and recognize existing private property and contract entitlements in activities that generate environmental benefits. These would
include ownership, through trademark and patent protection, of the
output of research and development in environmentally sensitive products, and, under legal protection, inclusion of applicable standards of
environmental quality within the bundle of product attributes to be
marketed to purchasers. The latter would necessarily mean that producers would be encouraged to inform prospective purchasers of the
environmental benefits associated with their purchase decisions. The
second and more obvious role of the state is the role governments take in
assisting producers and consumers to assure that information about the
environmental characteristics of products and services is accurate.
Given the myriad ways in which markets do not work, one critical
and continuing role for governments would seem to be called for in
assisting consumers and corporate planners to assess critically those
environmental claims being made by suppliers. Several possible responses to the problem of exploitation and misinformation that consumers face present themselves. These range from the institution of
direct, coercive regulation in the form of prosecutions under the federal
Competition A d 2 to purely private initiatives, including the development of sophisticated product life-cycle environmental impact assessments by manufacturers. Pragmatic arguments can be made to the effect
that each of these responses has an appropriate place in addressing the
6'

62

O f course, governments are necessarily implicated in markers in a variety of ways through the
recognition of intellectual property rights, in decisions to influence capital investments and
research and development &v&unentsfSthrough,for example, tax policy,-governmenc procurement policy and in promoting environmental education policies.
RS.C. 1985, c. C-34, as am. S.C. 1986, c 26, s. 19 (formerly CombinesInvestigationh). Other
federal legislation, such as the TextikLabeUingArt,RS.C. 1985 c. T-10,the FoodandDnrgsAct,
RS.C. 1985 c. F-27, and the Commer PackagigandLabeffingArt,RS.C. 1985, c. C-38, also
contain provisions with consequences for commercialadvertising. Provincial legislation such as
the British Columbia T r d Practice Act, RS.B.C. 1979. c. 406 and the Ontario Businm
PracticesAct, RS.O.1980, c. 55 hrther constrain fslse or misleading advertisingby commercial
interests.
The applicability of this secondary federal legislation as well as the relevant provincial
legislation to misleading environmentally related advertising, raises essentially the same issues
as the Competition Act; therefore, I will be addressing my remarks to that legislation.
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problems associated with the publishing of environmental product
claims by the private sector.

The most coercive response of governments is increased direct regulation of misleading information under provincial trade practice legislation and federal misleading advertising legi~lation."~
There is some
evidence that this may in fact be happening now. The Director of
Investigation and Research under the Competition A n noted in April
1990 that the federal Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs
would be employing the Act to deter "vague, incomplete or irrelevant"
claims that may confuse purchasers and that may diminish the credThe current legislative
ibility and effectiveness of such ad~ertising.~
framework at the federal level, however, treats misleading advertising as
a criminal offence, thus demanding proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
the commission of the offence and utilizing the criminal justice system
Given current enforcement policy and
as the enforcement in~titution.6~
'3

A complete discussion of the success or failure of the urposes of the misleading advertising
sections of the CompetitionAct is beyond the scope of $is aper. There are, however, statistics
indicative of enforcement policy which are readily avai able and of interest here. Section
5z(1)(a), the section most directly referent to the promulgation of false or misleading advertising, has only resulted in prosecutions since its inclusion in the Combines Investigation Act in
1969. Since 1969, the section has been used in much more vigorous fishion. The most recent
issue of the Canada, Department of Consumer and Cor orate AfFairs, Mis&adingAdveniring
Bttlletin ~Tanuarv March IWI). for examole. shows a tom
! of 66 convictions resulting from 282
chug,es Gr the Lurrent fiscxy& for violitions of the misleading advertising provis&ns of the
Art. This total is consistent with the to& from the previous eight
- to ten years. See V. Black,
in& note 65 and accompanying test.
See Gnada, Department of Consumer and Corporate AfFairs, "Environment-related Advertising (Green Advertising)" MrikadingAdvertisingBulktin (April-June1.990)ar1.The difficultyof
applying eneral misleadingadvertising legislation to environmental advertising has led at least
one juris8ction to introduce legislation directed specifically at the problems generated in this
contest. In 1990, the California legislature enacted a bill which amended the Business and
Profiijions Code. The bill extends the truthful advertising laws by requiring that products sold
with environmental impact claims meet specified criteria. It defines the terms "ozone friendly,"
"biode radable," "photodegradable," "recyclable" and "recycled" for the purposes of advertising an also requires that persons making general environmental claims about their products
(e.g. "environmentally friendly," "eco-friendly" or "a green product") maintain records which
substantiate the claim and which are available to the public upon request. Violaton are subject
to a term of imprisonment of up to six months or to a fine of up to $2500.
The definition of "recyclable, ' for example, requires that the article can be "conveniently
recycled.. in every county in California with a population over 300,000 persons." It is to be
noted that upon signin the bill, the governor objected to this term particularly as being
"impermissibly vague to e the basis ofacriminal statute because it does not clear1 statewhat is
necessary to meet the test of convenience." He cited other definitions in the bil as either too
vague or too strict. The major objection is that, in the Face ofsuch vague language, manufacture n may forego providing any labels at all (even where the packaging is more environmentally
friendly thm other packaging). This would be counterproductive to the goal of encouraging
packaging which is environmentally sound and recyclable.
Section yz(~)(a)of the Competition Act makes it an offence to make any representation to the
public which is fike or misleading in a material respect. Section 52(1)(b) makes it an offence to
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the context in which misleading environmental advertising occurs, it is
unlikely that the Competition Act will be used except in the most
egregious cases of misleading environmental information.
A search of the relevant sources has thus far failed to reveal a single
instance of a prosecution under the federal CompetitionAct for misleading or false advertising in relation to the environmental benefits of a
product or package. This may change as the use of "green" labelling in
advertising and promotions increases, and less-than-scrupulous firms
continue their attempts to manipulate the market through the use of
incomplete or untrue information. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that
prosecutions are, in any event, less likely given the fact that consumers
do not suffer direct economic losses as a result of claims about the
environment in relation to a given product. For the most part, prosecutions under the relevant legislation proceed on the basis of potential or
direct economic loss to consumers upon the failure or inability of the
product to perform as advertised. And while s. 36 of the CompetitionAct
permits a person who is injured through a violation of the Act to sue for
and recover any such loss, it is obvious that such litigation in an
individual case would be time consuming, uncertain and extremely
expensive relative to the expected gains. Simple altruism might motivate
a consumer to purchase certain products on the basis of their environmental characteristics; only super-altruism, however, would motivate a
consumer to litigate the corresponding misleading environmental
claims under s. 36 of the Act for the public good.
Most important, enforcement of the Actis extremely difficult in light
of the current scientific uncertainty expressed in debate about many of
the claims made by manufacturers. Much of the uncertainty is due to the
virtual impossibility of generating credible cradle-to-grave environmenmake any representation to the public concerning the performance, efficacy or length of life ofa
product that is not based on adequate and proper testing. One complication with this section,
which reveals just how ill-conceived the CompetitionAnis as an effective regulatory instrument
in this context, is that it m i p not even appl to this situation since environmental claims may
not be claims relating to 'performance, e ca or length of life."
Section 52(3 of the A n contains the s c h e d x of penalties for violation of s. 5z(1). Upon
conviction as an indictable offence, the offender is subject to a fine at the discretion of the court
or amaximum five years in prison or both. On summary conviction, there is a fine not to exceed
twenty-five thousand dollars or a maximum one year in prison or both. The average fine per
charge for violation of s. 52(1)(a) has not been large nor would it seem to be of si nificant
deterrent effect. In 1987-88, for example, the average fine per charge was $2,393 whi& was in
line with the averages for the previous eight years. The average fine per conviction was $6,653.
Fines for corporate offenders were generally larger than those for natural persons. In 1987-88,
the avera e fine for corporations convicted of violating s. 5z(1)(a) was $7,635 while for
individwk it was $2,688. See Canada, Department of Consumer and Corporate AlGrs.
Mishading Advertising BuIletin (1989).
For a more complete discussion of the provisions of the Competition Act as they relate to
advertising, with particular emphasis on how the decision to use a criminal law model has
effected the e of controls which have been developed, see V. Black, "A Brief Word About
~dvertisin~,'?1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 509.
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tal impact analy~es."~
The due-diligence defence permitted in s. 52(1)(b)
of the Acf7xvould permit manufacturers to avail themselves successfully
of the due diligence defence to demonstrate that they took reasonable
care in assessing the environmental impact of a product, which would
also present a substantial impediment to successful prosecutions in all
but the most flagrant violations of the Act.
Paradoxically, but not surprisingly, we find that the CompetitionAct,
which incorporates a command-and-control model of regulatory intervention, is the primary instrument available to the government in
dealing with the second-order difficulties produced by an imperfect
economic regulatory instrument. Nonetheless, because the Act is "enforced" through non-coercive instruments as well as through the criminal justice system, it remains of considerable interest as a regulatory tool
in addressing the problems associated with misleading environmentrelated advertising. In particular, companies engaged in environmentrelated advertising can and should appreciate that the Bureau of Competition policy focuses primarily on ensuring compliance through initiatives in communication and education. One aspect of the Bureau's
compliance policy is the proffering of advisory opinions to suppliers
who wish to avoid coming into conflict with the Act:' Although not
binding, the Director of Investigation and Research takes into account
prior case law, outside legal opinion and departmental policy in consideringwhether a specific marketing or advertising practice violates the
misleading advertising provisions of the Act." A recent example is the
advisory opinion issued by the Department suggesting that any general
claim, such as "Environment Friendly," that implies an environmental
benefit "should be used with extreme caution and be made m e a n i n g
by providing specific product characteristics that set out the reason for
the claimed benefit."70
66
67

G9

70

I describe the intractable problems of producing reliable product life-cycle analyses in Part V.
The Supreme Court of Canada in the recent decision of Whoksak Travel Group v. R (24
October 1991) file nos. 21779, 21786, upheld the constitutionality of the "reverse onus"
provision ofs. JZ of the CompetitionAct. Seven members of the Court held that the reverse onus
rovisions violated s. rr(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms by denying the accused the
genefits of a pmumtion of innocence in a prosecution under the Act. However, three of those
seven found the reverse onus provision justified under s. I of the Charter, and these three,
combined with the nvo members of the Court who found no violation ofs. I I ( ~constituted
)
a
majority in the result
upheld the constitutionality of the provision.
See, for esample, note 7 0 and accompanying text.
The Department's compliance and enforcement policy is described in detail in Canada,
Depattment of Consumer and Corporate AEairs, Director of Reseatch and Investigation,
Competition Act, "Program of Compliance," Information Bulletin No. 3 (June 1989).
See Canada, Department of Consumer and Corporate AEairs, "Summaries ofAdvisory Opinions" MiskadingAdvertisingBulktin (January-March 1991) at 8. The Bulktin goes on to specify
that:
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The deployment of advisory opinions and communication strategies
to displace the criminal justice system in achieving the regulatory
objectives of the Competition Acts misleading advertising provisions is
This
believed by most to be an important advance in regulatory poli~y.~'
framework of moderated negotiation and planned communication between the regulatory agency and the private sector has culminated in the
development, undertaken in cooperation with the federal Department
of Consumer and Corporate Mairs, of voluntary codes of advertising
practice that are intended to address misleading environmentally related
advertising in Canada.

A second response to the difficulties that consumers confront in assessing environmental claims has been the development of codes of advertising conduct either by regulatory agencies, as in the United States7'
and Britair~,'~ or by cooperative government-industry initiatives, as in
Canada.74 The Canadian Department of Consumer and Corporate
Moreover, the claim shouldalso indicate whether it is related to the product or the packagin
materials. In addition, a re resentation that conveys a message of overall environmentaf
benefit due to the absenceof!substance
known to be environmentallyharmful should nor be
used unless it can be demonstrated that the product is less damaging overall to the
environment as a result of the absence of that substance. That is, it should not contain any
other substances that are equally or more damaging to the environment.
This advisory opinion specifically takes into account the Guiding Principles for Environmental Labelling and Advertising, which the Director has stated will be considered in the
application of the misleading advertisin and deceptive marketing practices provisions of the
Competition A a particularly ss. 52 ($(a7 and gz(~)(b).
and Corporate Mars,Efectiue and Equitable Enforceon Amendments to the Misleading A d u h i n g and Deceptive
at 7-10 and Canada, Department of
for Administrative and Civil
A.W. Nielsen and Edward P.
Belobaba) (1981).
72 SeeAttorney Generals for California, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New York,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin, "THE GREEN REPORT 11: Recommendations for Responsible Environmental Advertising" (May 1991).
73 In addition to voluntary codes of practice in Britain, certain media advertising is subject to
a proval by a regulatoryauthority. The Independent Television Commission established under
t i e Broadrasting An. 1990 has issued a drafi Code which provides that:
No advertisement may encourage behaviour prejudicial to the protection of the environment.. .All claims relating to environmental impact must complywith guidelines approved
by the Commission from time to time for this purpose.
The ITC must clear all television advertisements through its ITA COPY CLEARANCE
SECRETARIAT and may seek justification for environmental claims before allowing an
advertisement to be transmitted. As well, it may respond to consumer complaints and take
appropriate action afrer inquiring into the relevant circumstances.
74 Industry self-regulation is generally an amalgam of three categories: promotional (designed to
benefit, foster or enerate commercial activity within the indust ); standard setting (promulgated to protect t e public from unethical practitioners); and en orcement. Although wmpli-

i
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Affairs, for example, recently initiated and participated in a
government-industry initiative designed to produce a code of green
advertising that will provide guidance to industry in an effort to promote veracity and enhance comparability of marketing claim~.'~This
joint government and industry task force resulted in the issuance in 1991
of the Guiding Principlesfor Environmental Labelling and Adverttiinguidelines that were held out as assisting (although certainly not resolving the difficulties of) those purchasers unable to assess critically environmental product claims.''
The Principles, which are to be adopted by the wide range of industry
sectors involved in their development, direct that:

ance with such regulation is voluntary and non-statutory (as distin uished from those
professions and industriesmhich require adherence to statutory schemes oEelf-regulation, such
as physicians and surgeons, lawyers, engineers, teachers and stockbrokers), governments ma
maintain their legislativesupervisionbut play a residual role. As ~ r~ustice
.
~ o u ~ lremarkel
as
"Government v:ould keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled,
cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would never have to be used." (RS. Karmel,
"Securities Industry Self-Re ulation - Tested by the Crash" (1988) 45 Wash. & L.R 1297).
Support for schemes of sek-regulation includes the arguments that not only is the taxpayer
seemingly spared the cost of regulation, but the industry is more efficiently policed by those
with the greatest expertise and knowledge-members of the relevant industry. As the codes are
volunnr): it is thought that industry members will more closely adhere to the spirit of the
regulations and not attempt evasive, lawyerly tactics to avoid compliance. The non-statutory
nature of the re latory scheme also circumvents the expense, delays and complexities of the
legal system. ~eKregulationis better designed to address ethical, as op osed to legal, conduct
and is ofien more flexible than any scheme of governmental regulation t us allowingfor greater
latitude in addressing a given set of issues.
These perceived benefits are countered by arguments that self-regulation is subject to bias
and conflict of interest charges in the application of the regulations as firms serve as jud es in
their own cause. Furthermore, the public is generally very poorly represented in any en orcement procedures. Self-regulation has also been criticized for serving as a barrier to entry for new
competitors unable or unwilling to meet unrealistic or self-serving standards set by an entrenched industry. As well, enforcement of self-regulatory codes is commonly done privately,
thus attenuating the powerful reputational effects of public enforcement mechanisms. Finally,
self-regulation throu h voluntary codes often Fail to respond to systemic problems within an
industry i n s o b as t!l e focus only on individual violations of the standards.
See generally M. ~ i k e n e "Leaving
~,
the Field - Government Regulatory Agencies and
Media Self-Regulation" (1986) 9 University of New South Wales L.R 53 and RS. Karmel,

R

f

supra.

A similar initiative has been taken in Britain by the Committee ofAdvertising Practice (CAP).
In February 1990, the Advertising Standards Authority of CAP issued a guidance note
addressin environmental claims which is substantially the same as the guidelines recently
publishe%in Canada. See Lovel, White and Durant, "Marketing the Environment, A Guide to
L
e
d Issues Concerning 'Green' Advertising and Labelling" (on file at the University of British
Columbia).
76 See Canada, Department of Consumer and Corporate AfLirs, "Guidin Principles for Environmental Labelling and Advertising" (1o91).
. . The trade associations invo ved in developing the
principles includedvrhe~ssociationuof
Canadian~dvertisers,the Canadian~dvertising'~o;ndation, the Canadian Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance Association, the Canadian Council of
Grocery Distributors, the Canadian Manuhcturers of Chemical Specialties Association, the
Consumers' Association of Canada, the Grocery Products Manuhcrurers of Canada, the
Packaging Association of Canada and the Rerail Council of Canada. In addition, there was late
and limited consultation with some environmental groups, legal firms industries, foreign
governments and all levels of government in Canada.

75
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I.

Industry is responsible for ensuring that any claims and/or representations are accurate, and in compliance with the relevant legislation.

2.

Consumers are responsible, to the extent possible, for appropriately
using the information made available to them in labelling and
advertising, thereby enhancing their role in the marketpla~e.~

3. Environmental claims and/or representations that are ambiguous,
vague, incomplete, misleading, or irrelevant, and that cannot be
substantiated through credible information andlor test methods
should not be used.

4. Claims and/or representations should indicate whether they are related to the product or the packaging material^?^

The Principles encourage marketing claims that include specific and
quantifiable information and that exclude absolute claims. In addition,
the Principles explicitly address current marketing activities involving
such claims as "Recycled," "Recyclable," and "Degradable" and further
direct precisely how and in what circumstances those words may be used
in marketing pr~grams.~'The
Principlesare to supplement the Canadian
Code ofAdvertising Standard enforced by the Standards Division of the
Canadian Advertising Foundation-a wholly controlled industry association. They will also be considered by the Director of Investigation
and Research in the application of the misleading advertising and
deceptive marketing practices provisions of the Competition Act, which
remains the major avenue of enforcement in this area.
The preamble, however, goes further and provides that
while detailed technical roduct information is not always readily available, there are a
number ofsources for cre 'ble information that will assist consumersto become informed on
the various waste reduction and recycling programs available within their communities.
This statement reveals a certain naivety in the drafters of the guidelines. It is lek unstated where
one may obtain that information or how it might be linked to consumers' purchase decisions.
Also, the question of lack of information is much broader than lack of knowledge about the
presence of waste management programs.
78 Ibid at 7 .
79 An example oftheway in which theGuidelinesmight operate can be taken from their treatment
of the concept of "recyclable," The Guidelines provide ac 10 that
extreme care should be taken when making the claim of recyclabili on products or material
for which a recycling infrastructure does not generally exist. C aims of recyclability by
industry (retailers, manuFacturers and distributors) should not be made simply because the
material is technically recyclable. (emphasis added)
The message, of course, is that vague claims of environmental benefit cannot be made unless the
claims are founded upon appro riate and reliable scientific and technological information
which is substantiated and verifiagle in
p he weakness ofthe ~uidelines
is that they do
not set standards for the use of thii or other terms. In comparison, the State Attorney-Gene&
Task Force Report recommends that such claims only be made "in a manner that clearly
discloses the general availability of the advertised option where the product be sold." See
Recommendation 2 in nrpra, note 72 at 18.
77

8,
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The purported object of the Guiding Principles for Environmental
Labelling and Advertising is to ensure that those characteristics that
allegedly make a product a better choice for the environment should be
rendered obvious to purchasers. This initiative is important to consumers who need aids to interpreting environmental claims with some sense
of the meanings accurately attributable to the variety of words and
symbols commonly used, and who need the advantage of a possible
enforcement mechanism administered by the Standards Division of the
Canadian Advertising Foundation.
Self-regulation through marketing guidelines, however, raises serious
concerns about the commitments both of I~rivate-sectorindustries and
of public-sector regulatory authorities in responding to abuses in this
area. The Principles are drafted in extremely vague language. Moreover,
they simply fail to address the enormous range of product-specific
environmental claims that consumers confront. The Principles are, for
esample, premised only on the short-sighted view that the problem is
purely the result of a dyshnctional marketplace. While this is true,
perfect information alone will not solve the environmental problems
that are the result of the aggregated purchase decisions of large numbers
of cor~orationsand consumers.s0
\W;at the Principkslack is an unambiguous signal to industry of the
elevated standards expected of them once it has begun to exploit
consumer demand for the environmental good.81Misleading advertising in the area of environmental claims is quite unlike many other
consumer problems. As I argued earlier, the impact of market dysfunction in this case is much more serious than misinformation relating to
product quality and performance. Consumer errors, taken in their
aggregate, shape Canada's economy and environment in irremedial
ways, and it is next to impossible for individual consumers to monitor
contractual compliance. The Principles should also urge the participation of environmental groups and concerned individuals in the enforcement process.82
so See Part
81

HZ

VI.

The Guidelines' effectiveness might be enhanced if it were made clear that they are linked to a
much broader regulatory agenda which will include full enforcement ofthe relevant federal and
provincial statutes which esist to address instances of misleading advertising. The educative
function of the document should exrend beyond i s narrow terms and reinforce a more rigorous
p r o ~ n mof enforcement than is now apparent,
at least in the federal arena.
-~ h c a b s e n c of
e environmental representation in the enforcement process is paralleled by their
absence in the production of the Guidelines. Althouah there wjs some consultation with
environmendi;rs: and others, the make-up of the workihg group which developed the Guidelines reveals an ovenvhelming predominance of industry rrade associations. Information about
the comples \vays in which products and pac ing affect the environment is nor uniquely
within the understandingofindustry. At thevery east, it should be incumbent upon Consumer

?'
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Finally, the Principles reflect only a simplistic and naive appreciation
of the complexities involved in product life-cycle analysis. They prohibit, for example, claims of environmental benefit based on the absence
or removal of an environmentally harmful substance if the product
contains other substances that are equally or more damaging to the
environment. The drafters appear to have been optimistic about the
complexity, certainty, and normativeness of environmental impact assessment. It is not clear how one would demonstrate or indeed justify a
conclusion that a particular substance is "more or equally damaging to
the en~ironment."'~Similarly, the Application section provides that
environmental claims, where applicable, are to be premised on appropriate, reliable, and verifiable scientific and technical information. But
this statement does not go far enough. Prior to their being made in
public, all statements by industry relating to the environmental characteristics of their products should be grounded in the verifiable existence
of a comprehensive product life-cycle environmental impact assessment. Representations of environmental benefit, if consumers believe
them, generate inferences that environmental assessment research bas in
fact been undertaken by the advertiser. The failure of industry during
the past two centuries to engage in the kind of research capable of
identifying the environmental costs of product manufacture, transportation, use and disposal is one of the reasons we now find ourselves living
on a planet at risk It would be far better that no environmental claim be
permitted unless and until that life-cycle assessment has been performed.84 Lacking a requirement that suppliers assess environmental
claims on the basis of a cradle-to-grave environmental impacts analysis
and Corporate A&in to include substantial representation from environmental groups across
the country on furure work in this area. Such roups can and will bring scientific and technical
expertise, the organized voice and opinions o thousands of environmentalists, and significant
legitimacy to the entire process.
83 Another exam le of the naivety of the draften of the Guidelines is the discussion of "recyclabiliry", \v[ich indicates a fundamental lack of u n d e m d i n g of an imporrant environmental issue associated with recycling. The technical feasibility of recycling is not the critical
variable in determiningthe environmental characteristicsofa product. T o determine whether a
recyclability characteristic is "good", one would have to know the environmental costs of
recycling, something which, as I point out later, is not easy to demonstrate. As well, the
supposed environmental benefits associated with recyclability do not come from the collection
of waste. An impottant benefit of a re clability characteristicis that waste is transformed into
industrial or consumer oods and, us, reduces demand for renewable or nonrenewable
resources. Unless both coflection facilities and markets exist within the particular
area for collected goods, the environmental benefits of "re clability' are not o vious.
Similarly, the treatment of degradabili ignores consi erable data which suggest that
de radability may interfere with recycling e orts and may result in substantial environmental
risfs associated with the byproducts of degradation. hat research is now verywell known, and
the fact that there is little discussion of it confirms the benefits which would be associated with
implementingsuggestions to include environmental expertiseon any further work in this area.
84 This is, admittedly, onestep funher than what has been recommended in the Unitedstates. See
Recommendation 1.7 in nrpra, note 72 at 11.
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of the product or service, the veracity of all environmental claims in the
meantime must be doubted.85Ultimately, the enforcement of the Principles becomes as problematic as the enforcement of the misleading
advertising provisions of the Competition Ach and for similar reasons.86
The Principles, despite their shortcomings, represent a only a tentative first step toward addressing the rapidly expanding growth in misleading environment-related advertising. But given the serious negative
environmental impacts generated by this kind of misinformation in the
consumer marketplace, together with the serious substantive deficiencies of the Principlesas presently drafted and the absence of an independent, public enforcement institution, it is unlikely that this particular
regulatory instrument alone, at least in its present form, could ever
address the problem adequately.

Government intervention in the market place is recognition that for
consumers to make environmentallyappropriate choices when canvassing the marketplace, they must have easy access to environmental
impact information that is accurate, reliable and independently verifiable. Just behind regulation and voluntary advertising codes, the third,
and much more sophisticated government initiative intended to assist
purchasers in comparing and verifying environment-related product
claims, is the variety of recently developed public8' and privates8 environmental labelling programs. Such programs represent a relatively new
The document thus directly contradicts the fundamental tenet of environmental analysis
represented in the Chadian EnvironmentalProtection Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 16 (4th Supp.). As I
point out in Part V, such analyses are extremely difficult to erform with any degree of
confidence in their ourcomes. Nonetheless, there is nothin in i e Guiding Principles which
would encourage rnanuhcturers to invest the resources in eveloping the methodology to do
product life cycle analyses.
8' See Pan V.
87 In Canada, the federal government's Environmental Choice Program, established in 1989,
represents theonly publicenvironmental labellingprogram now in existence. The history ofthe
program and its regulatory rationale is described in D. Cohen, "Procedural Fairness and
Incentive Programs: Reflections on the Environmental Choice Program", (1991) Alberra Law
Rev. (forthcoming).
88 While some would argue that a governmental presence in ewlabeling programs is extremely
important, a purely private initiative has been organized in the United States. The American
Green Seal program, given themarket impact ofAmerican rnanuhcturers andpurchasers, could
very well become the standard in North America. A description of the Green Seal program may
be found in D. Hayes, "Harnessing Market Forces to Protect the Earth", (Winter 1990-91)
Ismez in Scienceand Tecbnologv46. However, private initiatives run the risk of industry-ca rure
and substantial consumer c o n h i o n if environmental standards which lack rigour are &eloped. See "Eco-babble", (21 September 1991) The Economist 84. It may be that, ultimately, we
will need to develop re atory instruments to address the problems associated with this
re latory instrument, w ich itself is desi ned to address the problems associated with the use
ot6umarkets to regulate the production o environmental quality!
85
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example of economic instruments designed to regulate corporate and
human activity affecting the en~ironment.'~
Specifically, these programs attempt to modify producer behaviour in
product research and development through the creation and distribution of a marketable entitlement. In the case of the federal government
in Canada, this entitlement consists of a license to use an Ecologo,SOa
graphic signature of the company's commitment to the environment for
display in its advertising and on its packaging. The primary public
policy objective of environmental labelling programs is to reduce the
rate of environmental deterioration through the substitution in relevant
markets of "ecolabelled" products, services and processes for products
currently distributed in those markets.9' It is clear that these programs
can also play an important role in addressing the market dyshnction
represented by consumer confusion and exploitation related to private
initiatives involving environmental ad~ertising.~'
Although the ecolabelling programs now in place in Europe and
North America are extraordinarilydiverse, they nonetheless share some
hndamental characteristicsthat have been currently incorporated in the
Canadian Environmental Choice Program. The Canadian program,
which is perhaps the most sophisticated and well-developed of the
existing programs, involves four stages. First, the Environmental
An interesting but naively optimistic proposal for the development of an environmental
labelling initiative in the United States is found in J.P. Kimmel, Jr., "Disclosing the Environmental Impact of Human Activities: How a Federal Pollution Control Program Based On
Individual Decision Making and Consumer Demand Might Accomplish the Environmental
Goals of the 1970s in the ~ggos," (1989) 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 505.
The first example of this type of program was begun in West Germany in 1978, apparently at
least in part in response to a Recommendation adopted by the Council of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1976 which ur ed member countries to
develop comprehensivewaste mana ement policies. The "Blue Ange ' logo is now carried by
over 3000 products in some 60 pro uct categories. Canada and Japan were the next to adopt
such programs, in 1988 and 1989 respectively. Similar efforts are lanned or underway in
Norway, Sweden, France, the Netherlands and, through a number o mainly private agencies,
the United States. See "Eco-Labels: Product Management in a Greener Europe" (Camberly,
U.K.: Southwell Press Ltd., 1989), on file at the University of British Columbia and OECD,
Environmental Labeling in OECD Countrirs (Paris, 1991).
90 The Canadian Ecologo is a stylized maple leaf formed from the wings of three intertwined
doves, with "Environmental Choice" and "Choix Environnemental" encircling the leaf. The
program requires disclosure of relatively specific information respecting the particular environmental "benefit" associated with the use of the product.
91 Other public policy objectives might include the development of a subsid program to
encourage research and development in "environmental know-how" and tednology, with
resources for the subsidy coming from the marketplace rather than taxation revenues, and the
eneration of a generalized awareness of the complex links between private consumptive
gehaviour and the condition of the public biophysical environment.
92 T o date, the program has addressed some fifty categories ranging from re-usable diapers to rerefined motor oil; from low solvent water-based paints to fine paper products made from
recycled fibre; and from light bulbs to newsprint.
89
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Choice Boardg3selects and tentatively defines a product category.'* Very
early on in this process, a life-cycle biophysical-environmental impact
review of the products constituting the proposed product category is
~repared.'~
The second stage involves h h e r development, through the
Canadian Standards Association (C.S.A.)9Gand the voluntary multisectoral task
of the environmental guidelines issued by the
Minister of the Environment under the Canadian EnvironmentalProtection Act. These guidelines, which are based on environmental impact
assessments, are specific to each product category and address the
performance and design specifications to which products must comply
in order that they may be allowed to display the federally owned
E~ologo?~
After the guidelines have been M y developed at the taskforces level, they are then made subject to review by the independent,
scientifically competent Co-ordinating Technical Committee and to a
Go-day public-review process. The third stage follows the promulgation
of the new environmental guidelines and involves the licensing, for a fee,
The Board is established under s. 5 of the Canadian Environmental Protection Actas an Advisory
Board to the Minister of the Environment. It consists of fifteen persons and a Chair appointed
by the Minister for indefinite terms. Currently, the Board consists of representatives of
consumer groups, environmental groups, several science and social science disciplines and
industry.
"4 Product category suggestions are sometimes generated internally within the program. More
often, the Board d m s on suggestionsfrom external sources, including product manufacturers
and suppliers, environmental and consumer groups and individual consumers. Serious concerns
have been raised by industry about the lack of an early warning system which would inform
them of prospective categoriq and the absence of a systematic approach to the prioritization
and rejection of proposed product categories.
The Environmental Choice Program, like more formal regulatory authorities and the private
sector, has had to develop data bases and a methodology to perform product life cycle review
without the benefit ofa pre-existin body ofknowledge and ex ertise in this field. There can be
little doubt that the life cycle anafyses and reviavs employe by the Program are subject to
precisely the same criticisms that have been made about life cycle analyses produced by the
private sector. See Part V(D).
"6 Environment Canada has contracted with the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) to
~rovidethis service. The CSA has substantial national and international credibilirv in develo~ing consumer and industrial standards.~~owever,
the CSA is simply an adminiitrative in&structure. It provides secretariat services for the task forces which consist of voluntary industry,
environmental and consumer and government representatives. The CSA does not set standards,
nor does it engage in research on which the standards are based.
97 Concerns have been raised regarding the constitution of these task forces. Environmentalists,
although partially funded, have undoubtedly been under-re resented in the guideline development process. As well, the participation ofsmaller firms has een uneven due, at least in art, to
the research resources anilable to larger established firms. T o a limited degree, $e under-re resentation of those groups has been ofiet by the use of program staff and Environment
CanaL resources to ensure that all information is subject to independent verification and
assessment.
98 In developing the environmental guidelines, Environment Canada has been guided by a
concern that all roposed roduca andservices encompassed by the pro ram will generateanet
environmental genefit A n g into account the entire life cycle of &e service or product.
Consistent with the complete product life cycle concept inherent in the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, the Environmental Choice Program employs a preliminary environmental
impact assessment of all proposed product, service and packaging categories.
73
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of Ecologo use in the product marketing of individual manufacturers,
importers and retailers that meet or exceed the guidelines. Important to
the licensing program is product testing and confirmation undertaken
by the C.S.A. to ensure that a particular product or group of products
complies with the environmental guideline requirements. This is the
fourth and final stage, where all licensed users are continuouslymonitored to ensure compliance with the environmental guidelines and the
terms of their licences. The licencing period is three years, and the
licensing agreement permits spot-auditing ofmanufacturing plants with
immediate access to all relevant production and purchase records.
Sanctions for non-compliance include contract termination, product
recalls and even damage recovery by the government," but is not clear
whether non-compliance lists will be made public under this program.
One can immediately identify several advantages of this form of
regulation over the command-and-control model, exemplified in the
Competition Act, and over the employment of industry-dominated
voluntary guidelines and processes. Environmental labelling programs
are attempts at generating reliable environmental impact assessments
across a broad range of products. These product-specific impact assessments are public records, ,for use by private producers who may be
completely independent of any association with the public regulatory
program. The assessments, themselves produced independently of any
single industry sector, present an extraordinarily valuable data base. And
if a product life-cycle analysis is incorporated into the environmental
labelling program, together the analyses provide some assurance that
purchase decisions will generate environmental benefits.
Further, environmental guidelines can, and often do, address the 111
range of environmental characteristicsconsumers consider in evaluating
environment-related product logos and conflicting environmental
claims made by supplier^.'^^ The use of multi-factorial environmental
impact assessments and/or multi-factorial environmental guidelines
substantiallyreduces the risks associated with uni-dimensional environmental adjustments that characterize many private initiatives. As well,
See "Environmental Choice Licensing Contract", on file at the University of British Columbia.
What remains to be answered, however, is whether the enforcement and compliance process
within environmental labelling rograms will be subject to the same paralyzing poltical
pressures that have characrerim! environmental compliance and enforcement policies in
Canada in recent years.
' 0 0 For example, Environmental Guidelines on all-purpose cleaners will likely address surhctants,
builders, solvents, scouring abrasives, stabilizers, disinfectants, bleach, preservatives, propellants, perfumes and deodorizers. The Guidelines will likely address a wide ran e of
environmental impacts including resource and energy use, packaging, chemical and bioPiysical im acts, ecological toxicity, VOC levels, biodegradability, eutrophication and aesthetic
degra8ation, human health risks, delive systems and disposal methods. See "Briefing Note
on All Purpose Cleaners," (1990). on fi e at the University of British Columbia.
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such programs will often ensure that the environmental guidelines
address non-environmental performance characteristics, thereby also
addressing the concern that environmental benefits associated with a
product are not offset by inadequate performance.lO'Also, the guidelines are reviewed tri-annually, ensuring that the standards are both
current and effective in generating the environmental benefits sought.
More importantly, this tightening of environmental standards means
that corporate investment in research and developmentwill be rewarded
through the development of guidelines that reflect increasingly higher
standards of environmental performance.
Perhaps most important of all, environmental labelling programs
using easily identifiable and verifiable logos reduce purchasers' search
costs to the absolute minimum. And to the extent that these programs
also rely on certification, compliance and verification requirements,'02
they represent a credible signal that the product so endorsed will
conform to the broad range of environment-related criteria discussed
earlier. These programs thus reduce the need for consumers to educate
themselves about the ovenvhelmingly technical, frequently complicated
environmental issues that must be addressed in environmental
planning.'03
lo'

For m o l e . the environmental benefits ootentiallv~eneratedbv market shifts to oaints which
ic comp&nds which cont;ibute to the
are form;laied to reduce the release of colatile o;
formation of local air pollution as well as to glob warming is reduced to the extent that the
performance of such paints require more fresuent use. Thus, environmental idelines must
incorporate product performance standards to ensure that the environmen benefits of the
product are, in hct, produced. See Environmental Choice Guideline, "Water Based Paints",
ECP-12-1990.
Under the Canadian program, the Environmental Guidelines are enforced through compliance and verification measures developed and implemented through the Canadian Standards
Association, eneraring confidence that the actual products purchased comply with the
guidelines. T us, consumers utilizing the program can have confidence that the specific
products purchased conform to the product specific environmental criteria contained in the
applicable Guidelines. In addition, the licensing contract imposes strict self-monitoring and
reporting requirements with significant penalties imposed for non-notification. Finally, the
Guidelines demand that licensedsupplierscertify that the are inactual compliancewith local,
provincial and national environmental legislation. ThereLre,
have some indication
that their procurement decisions, and the profits generated by those choices, are directed at a
subset of the industry which is not violating mandatory environmental regulations.
However, environmental labelling programs assume that the environmental preferences of
consumers can be identified, are generally identical, and are identical to, or com lementary
with, the environmental objectives of the individuals developing environmentafguidelines
within the environmental labelling pro rams. Confidence in this kind of regulatory instrument as an effective and defensible vehicfe to generate environmental benefits is reduced to the
cstent that the labelling programs cannot kniw the environmental preferences of consumers
to the extent that the preferences vary significantlyacross the *population and differ from those
of the individuals designing the Gdeknes.
Another, perhaps more fundamental, problem with such programs is that they might very
well lead consumers to believe that increased consumption will benefit the environment. That
will rarely, if ever be the case, and the communications policy of the Environmental Choice
Program attempts to be sensitive to this issue. See "IfYou're in the Market for a Better World,
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Even from this cursory analysis, what should be obvious about
environmental labelling programs is that they represent a radically
different regulatory approach to misleading advertising in comparison
with the traditional command-and-control instruments developed earlier in this century and codified under the federal Competition Act. But
all three of the regulatory responses to misleading environmental
advertising-mandatory regulations, voluntary guidelines, labelling
programs-require that either the private-sector actor or the publicsector regulator possess data on which to base, respectively, its environmental marketing claims or enforcement decisions. Without the necessary resources and methodologies with which to produce reliable
environmental impact assessments of consumer products and services,
we have little reason to be confident that either marketplace operation or
government intervention will be sufficient to generate genuine environmental benefits.

What all of this tells us is that the problem we face is not necessarily
represented by a choice from among different forms of regulation that
address misleading environmental advertising; rather, much, if not all,
of the private and public debate surrounding this issue is due to the
absence of refined, sophisticated methodologies capable of producing
reliable life-cycle environmental impact analyses'04 of the products and
services so heatedly discussed. Given all of the ways in which
environment-related product information can be misinforming, the
problems brought about specifically by the inability to verify claims
based on such information are substantial. Put simply, without better
methodologies, neither private-sector actors nor public regulators have
any assurance that their marketing and enforcement decisions are
soundly based on an accurate understanding of the environmental
impacts of the products and services that are the subject of regulation.'05
Read On," (16 September 1991) 104 MacLean's Ma ine (insert). However, private sector
advertising of licensed roducts may very well be g g n e d to encourage consumption of
roducts with serious a verse environmental impacts. For example, Eveready batteries have
geen advertisedwith lan ge which suggests that "nothing.. is kinder to the environment"
~ a i (20
( September 1991) A3.
than a battery!. See
104 Product life cycle assessmentcan be defined as the "systematic identification and analysis of the
environmental and health impacts associated with a product or service through all stages of in
life cycle". See Marbek Resource Consultants, "Product Life Cycle Assessmenp: Key Issues
and Options for the Environmental Choice Program," (May 1991) at I.
10s Virtually everyone who has examined this issue reco
these issues must be resolved if
consumer product markets are to be
environmental benefits.
See supra, note 72 at 11-17 and
Technical Framework for Life
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Thus, the most important initiative being taken in response to the
general needs of the consumers to verify and compare environmental
claims is the joint development by g~vernment'~'and industry of
credible, reliable environmental impact life-cycle analyses focused on
those products and services consumers have come to expect will slow the
rate of environmental degradation. Development of such analyses will
go some way tolvard ensuring that producers address the issue of
potential environmental impacts during the earliest stages of their
research and development.
Recent studies by the Environmental Protection Agency, in the
United States, suggest life-cycle analyses should focus on a broad range
of environment-related product and package variables, including content status as recycled or toxic; potential degradability, recyclability and
reusability; pollutive impacts on air, water, soil; and, potential for
energy and other forms of resource con~ervation.'~'Studies elsewhere
have recommended that life-cycle analyses should comprise nvo distinct
stages. The first would involve a quantitative inventory of material and
energy needs, and waste emissions levels (solid, liquid, gaseous, released
into the air, water and soil). The second stage would involve assessment
and characterization of the effects related to this material-energyemissions inventory in terms of potential risk to the ecology in general
and human health, habitats, and aesthetic surroundings in particular.108
T o the extent that one or more of these environmental variables can be
One of the more important and often ignored initiatives in the National Packaging Protocol is
the "development of methodologies and guidelines to be used in conducting environmental
profiles of packaging, allowing users to compare packaging choices." See Canadian Council of
Ministers of the Environment, National Packaging Protocol, Policy #I. As well, the Protocol
anticipates that industry will u n d e d e environmental profiles of their packaging in accordance with the guidelines.
One argument in favour of government activity in this area involves the public good
character of the methodolo involved in car ing out life cycle analyses. Once the methodology is produced, it is diffic t if not impossib e for a private producer to monitor its use, and,
thus, to capture the profits from its investment in developing the methodology. Simultaneously, once produced, the information can and should be transferred v i d y costlessl
from one producer to another. Finally, it is arguable that under-capitalized business, w h i d
cannot afford the initial investment in developing the methodology, might very well benefit
most from having access to it.
Another reason for government involvement in developing the methodolo for life cycle
analyses is that development of efficient markets in environmental goods willK facilitated if
the relevant environmental information is presented in a manner which assists urchasers in
making comparisons across products and services. Comparability is assisted i suppliers are
us in^- a uniform methodology
-. in their product specific environmental assessment processes.
See United States, Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Research and Development,
Risk and Reduction Eneineerine kboratorv,
BarkproundDonrrnenton
Ckan ProductsResearch
,"
and Implemen~tion(J&e 1 ~ ~
ch. 43. ,
108 This stage must ne-ily
involve risk assessment, which uses the information in the first
stage, determines the fate and transport of the releases and then addresses the athways by
which humans and other organisms will be exposed to the emissions. However, ris assessment
will nor be useful in addressing some impacts including ozone depletion, greenhouse gas
impacts, habitat loss and soil loss. See "Framework", supra, note 102, ch. 10.
106
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ignored or overlooked in the analyses, consumers, producers and regulators risk making decisions on the basis of distorted images of the
environmental impact of relevant products.
But interpretation and productive use of life-cycle analyses are complicated processes, requiring approaches ranging from simple pass-fail
matrices and qualitative impact assessment to more intricate quantitative weighting assessement schemes.'0g (On the other hand, going no
hrther than the inventory stage of identifying and quantifying particular emissions without concern for environmental impacts is arguably a
valid approach as well."') Although the methodology may or may not
acknowledge scientific uncertainty and the interaction of such uncertainty with raw data, it will always impute assumptions about the mixes
of technologies used and about the assessment methodologies used to
transform the data into environmental impact assessments."' Any such
analysis must acknowledge the assumptions inherent in its
development-relevant temporal and geographical boundaries; energy
input mixes; transportation modes and distances; disposal and recycling
technologies and related facilities; and "hte" environments, such as
rivers, groundwaters and airsheds."'
Available information on private-sector development of product lifecycle environmental impact analyses indicates that industry is only now
beginning to develop standard data bases and methodologies capable of
helping suppliers to evaluate product claims of the simplest (though
often misleading) order."3 But consumers who act as environmental
planners, along with regulators, can, and should, demand access to the
impact assessment results and undertake critical evaluation of them on
the basis of such ideas as have been presented above. Environmental
impact assessement studies currently are, and will likely remain the most
important source of environmental data upon which consumers and
regulators can rely in making their decisions.
Zbid, ch. 4.
See United States, Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Research and Development,
Risk Reduction Engineering Laboratory, "Technical Work Plan on Development of a
Consumer Product Lifecycle Analysis Methodolo
(August 1990) at 10. There are obvious
roblems with an inventory a proach which simp y discloses in uts and outputs. At the very
they are subeectto signi cant misinterpretation if readers elieve that they characterize
the environmend impact of the producr; they appear quantitatively unassailablebut are often
plagued by substantial uncertainties in the data on which they are based; and the use of
national data can hide regional or site specific variations. These and other related concerns ar
addressed in an industry workshop document, "LCA Implementation Strategy" (Ad hoc
Implementation Strategy Planning Committee, 23 August xggo), on file at the Univetsiry of
British Columbia.
111 Zbid at 11-12.
112 See "Framework", supra, note 102 at 31-33.
113 Zbid; supra, note 104; and The Conservation Society, "Product Life Assessments: Policy Issues
and Implications," (Washington: The Conservation Society, 1990).
lo9
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VI. PREFERENCE SHAPING AND PROPAGANDA1'*
For the most part, this article has been formulated upon the optimistic
premise that consumers, when supplied with appropriate, accurate,
reliable and verifiable information, will tend to make those purchasing
decisions most likely to effect the greatest environmental good or, at
least, do the least environmental harm. There is, one hopes, at least a
little truth in that premise. One hopes that people, generally, are not
cynics. Nor are they masochists. They will tend to do "the right thing,"
assuming that to mean doing what brings the least harm to themselves
and others insofar as they are aware of the harmfd potential of their
decisions. I have assumed most people to have what is, in the words of
Terry Eagleton, C La fairly sharp eye to their own rights and interests,"
and to be "uncomfortable at the thought of belonging to a seriously
unjust form of life."'15 Is there any reason to suspect that the vast
majority of people would be comfortable seeing themselves, even in the
abstract, as members of a terminally polluting, environmentally haz'1.5

I should ooint out at the outset of this discussion that I am not advocating environmental
propapn'da as government policy. \Ve wn talk about the role of governme& in providing
information, intormarion about information, public education, the op o m i t y for dialogue,
propaganda and so on, without ever agreeing on when one turns into i e other. Cate orizing
the experience of environmend acculturation will not assist us in thinkinp, seriously afout the
role ot'the state in the production of a particular set of environmental n o h . I have chosen to
use the term "propaganda" rather than a less emotionally laden word to bring out for the
purposes of this paper the veryworst images of a state destroying the freedom of its citizens to
define for themselves the way they want to live their lives.
My sense here is that thedispensingofpure Factual information, ifsuch a thing is possible, is
only a more coven form of propoganda. The very selection of what information to give, the
manner in which it is presented, the context and medium in and through which it is received
and so on, combine to determine its meanin While that means that there is no distinction
benveen "information" and "education" an2 "propaganda", I think that a persuasive argument can be made that we should recognize a distinction in designing regulatory instruments.
Regulation through information disclosure accepts consumer castes as given and simply
ensures that the information base on which com arisons are made is as accurate as possible,
accepting that the production of information itse f is a costly endeavour. Regulation through
propaganda refers to something more than the government merely conveying objective Facts.
Propaganda is a system through which image, colour, and appeals to human emotions are
employed in complicated ways to persuade consumers that they ought to engage in a certain
kind of activity. It is not enough to inform consumers that a particular species might be
adversely affected by their purchase decisionstaken in the aggregate. For the market to workas
a regulatory instrument, consumers must come to care about the existence of that particular
species, want to take personal steps to assist it, believe that they must change their behaviour
out of concern for that species and know that they ought to alter their personal choices to
reflect concern for that species.
In the case ofconsumer product markets and theenvironment, information might consist of
data about the number of trees which are reauired to be orocessed to oroduce a consumer rood.
or information about the biological differekes benve& o ~ d - ~ t o wforests
&
and tree h;s, or
about the implications on fish resources ofthe forestation ractices of relevant members of the
forest industry. Conversely, propaganda mi ht consist o how the information is communia t e d , what i m a m and emotions are evoked k v the information and whether the reader should
care about for& and fish and the natural invironment.
T. Eagleton, Ideolg: An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991) at 27.
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ardous life form, a life form that through its wastefullness and inefficiency is befouling its planet and killing itself?
The answer to that series of questions is obviously no, yet the
problems of indiscriminate pollution, hazardous waste and inefficient
use of resources continue to plague us. And the marketplace holds
alluring solutions, some of them pragmatically persuasive. But to leave
the inference that marketdace mechanisms alone could suffice to alleviate our environmental ill; would be to misread this DaDer and much of
what has peceded it in the work of others. The techinfcal objections to
the marketplace as a panacea are only one of the many sorts of hurdles to
be overcome in this area.
Speculating on the use of real markets, in which concern for delivery
of environmental benefits or at least in which the reduction of environmental harm could dominate, requires our going beyond the kinds of
analyses usually undertaken by economists. In a hypothetical marketwhat we can call an environmentally neutral product marketllG-only a
small interest in the way in which consumer preferences for competing
products is shaped. There, we can accept the tautological argument that
the collective outcome of consumer decisions based on those
preferences-that is, the mix of competitive products produced by the
mix of consumer preferences-is the one that we "ought" to have. But
where we attempt to use preferences for the environment as determinant
of the level andAdirectioiof environmental regulation-as in an environmentally positive hypothetical market-hdividual and collective
preferences for environmental quality become critically relevant.lI7
What this means should be obvious. The regulatory impact of markets in < <green" products will necessarily be a function of two
variables-impact assessment data and consumer preferences.l18 The

- -
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There may be very few completely environmentally neutral markets, but leaving aside for the
moment the potential environmental costs associated with the resources used to manufdcture,
transport, distribute, use, reuse and then dispose of a tennis racket, that product, to use a
limited example, is not environmentally harmful. When a consumer chooses a particular
racket, there is ve little external interest in that purchase. When one ignores the environment, the only Sected parries are the manufacturer, competitors, distributors, relevant
investors, creditors, employees and the consumer.
117 When environmental concern is superimposed upon the marketplace, the marker assumes
unprecedented importance to previously uninterested parries. What each consumer does in an
environmentally sensitive market is of import to other consumers and non-consumers alike.
The failureofthe market to respond to the dominant concern is premisedupon the inability of
all the interested parties to exert influence using instruments purely of the market such as
supply, demand and price.
118 It is also a product of rice. It is clear that as the prices of environmentallypreferred products
fall, more will bepu$ased. 1f theshifr to these products is from products which
more
environmental harm, then the effectiveness of usin thii kind of a regulatoryinstrument might
reduce the price of the enviromentally
be enhanced by government policies which mi
preferred product. These might include a tax poficy and an environmental labelling entidement pricing policy.
116

it
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first I have already addressed: regulation of environmental information
simply demands, within limits, accurate information about the environmental consequences of market activity. What I have attempted to
demonstrate so far is that the pursuit of accuracy in this context presents
a complicated set of problems that are exacerbated by our lack of
relevant scientific expertise, rendering all but ineffective the traditional
regulatory instruments currently used to address misleading advertising.
The second variable, that of preferences, consists of the ways in which
environmental information is interpreted by consumers. The significance and normative aspects of consumer preference information-for
example, whether consumers are concerned about global warming or
about the use ofvirgin, unrecycled materials in product manufactureare, of course, equally crucial to a full appreciation ofwhether or not any
particular manipulation of the market can effect any particular change.
Environmental regulators must appreciate that the collective preference for environmental improvement (assuming it can be reflected in
market choices at all) cannot be taken as given. Our choice of regulatory
instrument must be predicated on a specific regulatory objective and on
an educated forecast of the instrument's potential effectiveness in
achieving that objective. Without knowing the shape of each individual
consumer's utility functions or the degree to which such functions can
reflect preferences about environmental quality, we simply cannot accurately picture the ultimate environmental effect of regulatory
intervention.
Of greater concern is the realization that attitudes towards the environment are engendered through acculturation and socialization, which
are the result of complex interaction between formal eduction, family
orientation, market advertising, employment experience, community
participation, as well as a host of other factors, knowable and unknowable, that make us who we are. Relying on markets to generate environmental benefits means that we are faced, at the most elementary level,
with the need to understand (and perhaps modify) the attitudes, the
beliefs, and ultimately the behavioural patterns of consumers and
producers.
In Part 11, 1 described the classic response of governments and
economists, which has been primarily to focus on producers' activities
and to legislate the computation of environmental degradation into
production ~ 0 s t s . lBy
~ ~externalizing the production costs associated
117

In the market the pricesystem is used to conveyinformation to both producersand consumers;
prices reflectsociety's preferencesforcerrain goods and services. Thereare, however, siruations
ivhere marker
do not convey accurar&nformation. These situations arise when exter-
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with the disposal of pollutants, in all their forms, industry ends up
producing more than is economically and socially efficient and, accordingly, setting lower-than-efficient prices. Economic inefficiency is the
excess production that causes too much effluent to be dumped into the
environment. Its source is the incorrect pricing of the product: the
market price only reflects a firm's marginal private costs of production
but not the marginal social cost associated with that produ~tion.'~~
Thus, the market price does not accurately reflect society's preferences
for the product because it fails to take into account whatever damage the
production may inflict on third parties.
Through the use of direct regulation aimed at forcing producers to
internalize these cost^,'^' governments have intervened in the market in
an attempt to minimize the social costs associated with using the
environment as a receptacle for the by-products of the production
process. If direct regulation is effective, the firm is forced to internalize a
cost that it had previously externalized, thereby increasing their production costs accordingly. One can think of the goal of supply-side regulation as reconciling the marginal social-cost-of-production curve with
the firm's supply curve.
But in order to force the internalization of all of the costs of production to such an extent that the firm's marginal social-cost curve becomes
its supply curve, the government must have perfect information about
the negative environmental impact of the firm's activitie~.'~~
Clearly, the
government does not have perfect information about the environmental
impact of production processes, nor could it perfectly enforce costinternalization strategies were it to have access to perfect information.
While direct regulation of firm and industry activities would force some
internalization of the social costs of production, this internalization
would necessarily be incomplete. Government failure is surely no less
fiequent than market failure, and in an imperfect world, government
regulation will, at best, allow for market prices to reflect imperfectly the
external costs of production.
Ifone accepts that simply by focussing on producers it is impossible to
internalizeperfectly the negative externalitiesassociated with producers'
nalities are present. An externalityoccurs whenever the activities of one economic agent affect
the activities of another agent in ways that are not taken into account by the operation of the
market. W. Nicholson, Externalities and Public Goods" in Microeconomic Theory: B&
Principles and &ensions, 4th ed. (Chicago: The Dryden Press, 1989) at 718.
120 RS. Pindyck and D.L. Rubinfeld, "Externalities and Public Goods" in Microeconomics (New
York: Macmillan, 1989) at 621.
121 See Part 2, sums
lZ2 The government must have perfect knowledge about the mar inal social cost curve associated
with every firm, it must be able to formulate regulatory pokcies which will force com lete
internalization of these costs and it must be able to perfectly monitor the activities of the rms
in order to ensure that there is complete compliance with these regulations.
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activities, an immediate alternate focus of regulation presents itself. Like
producers, consumers-as well as other actors in the market-can
become the focus of regulatory intervention. Traditional regulation of
consumer behaviour may take the form of consumer information policies and consumption taxes. What I am proposing, however, is very
different-quasi-regulation by government through propaganda and
education of environmental behaviour. In short, consumer preferences
can be shaped and behavior patterns altered to follow a more "environmentally correct" path.
What current and proposed economic instruments have in common
is that they take consumer preferences as given, yet even this is problematic.Iz3The regulatory instrument that I will briefly explore here is what
Richard Stewart calls "preference-shaping," that is, convincing consumers ofwhy and how to change their consumption patterns. As a form
of regulatory intervention it is much less developed. Such an approach
to minimizing the external costs associated with production of a certain
outpur involves influencing demand for that output through modification of consumer attitudes and preferences for the sake of a particular
environmental good.
If the demand for consumer products with adverse environmental
consequences were lower, their prices should fall"* and their supply
should decrease accordingly. We assume also that as outputs fill, the
amount of pollution the firm causes likewise decreases. The government
could use propagandaIZ5to influence consumer demand so that consumers "choose" not to demand a product whose production generates
negative environmental externalities. This choosing results in an inward
shift of the demand curve; consumers demand less of the good at every

ment may very well be in a constant state of transformation as they are informed by political
debate. See RB. Stewarr, "The Reformation of American Administrative Law," (1975) 88
Harv. L. Rev. 1667 at 1704-5
124 A major difference benveen traditional environmental policies\vhich involve direct regulation
o f ~ hsupply
e
side and re atory measures which indirectly influence the demand side is their
aftecr on price. In bo cases, the equilibrium level of output is lower than before the
government intervened. When the government intervenes through adjusting private costs to
reflect social costs, prices increase to reflect the latter social costs associated with roduction.
When the government intervenes to alter tastes, consumer demand declines an as a result,
prices fill. It is not, therefore, the market price which changes to reflect the social costs of
production; rather, a lower consumer demand takes into account those social costs.
125 Regulatory intervention to correct market failure associated with imperfect information is, of
course, the least intrusive and most well-developed form of state action. See S. Breyer,
Reg~htionand its Refom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982) at 161-64 and
J.P. Kimmel Jr., mpra, note 89 at 530.
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price. The new demand curve is lower than the old industry demand
curve, reflecting this change in tastes."'
The new consumer demand can be thought of as representing a
demand curve having internalized the external social costs associated
with the production of a good; the new demand curve then represents
consumers acting like environmentally sensitive citizens, that is, some
choosing to consume less ofthe hazardous good, while others none at all.
The change in consumption patterns in response to the propaganda
occurs because the government has persuaded some consumers to act
like environmentallyconcerned citizens rather than self-interested consumers. Thus, governments can use propaganda to influence consumers
to internalize the social costs associated with products the production of
which generates adverse environmental irnpa~ts.'~'
What is clear, however, is that regulatory intervention to move the
demand curves of lawful products is still an under-developed form of
regulation; that government-funded environmental labelling programs
have both informational and propaganda chara~teristics,'~'and that
demand-side regulation through propaganda is likely to be fir more
effective than supply-side cost internalization.
The effectiveness of cost internalization strategy in reducing environmental harm depends on two groups of factors. It depends first on the
ability of the government to align an industry's marginal social-costof-production curve with its corresponding supply curve.12gAs discussed earlier, the extent to which firms will internalize the social costs
of production in response to regulation depends on the ability of the
government to ensure compliance with its regulations. Ensuring compliance with environmental regulations requires a substantial commitThe new equilibrium level of output will result in a lower level of pollution generated in the
production process. As well, the new equilibrium price is lower than it was, reflecting the fact
;hat at eve6 price consumers are willhg to purihase less ou ut.
The fact that a government
campaign aimed at ganging consumer tastes for a
certain rood does not result in a com~letecollaose in demand reflects the fact that some
consumzrs will nor be affected by the g&ernmen2s educational efforts. Some consumers will
be indifferent to the deleterious effects the production of the good has on the environment.
Those consumers who choose not to consume the good or to consume less of the good do so
because they derive utility from not consuming a good whose production is environmentally
harmful (or they derive disutility from knowingly consuming an environmentally unfriendly
product).
' 2 7 in one sense, this is similar to the government using supply side regulation in an attem t to get
producers to act like socially
members ofsociecy and inrerndize the socia fcosts of
. responsible
production.
128 See supra, note 89 at 38, in which reference is made to the Facts that labelling pro rams do not
simply provide information and that the label represents a conclusion "as to w ich product
deserves to be chosen on environmental grounds."
129 Put more simply, the effectiveness of cost internalization de ends on the extent to which
government regulation forces individual firms to internalize t e environmental costs associated with their productive activities.
'26
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ment of resources to enforcement, including both monitoring industry
participants and penalizing violators. The problem of information
asymmetry, also discussed earlier, renders it impossible for the government to monitor perfectly industry participants and, as a result, impossible for it to ensure complete cost internalization.
The effectiveness of a cost-internalization strategy also depends on
the market structure of the industry and on the price elasticity of the
product's demand. Assuming, for example, that an industry consists of a
single firm, essentially a monopoly, and that the price elasticity of
demand for its product is inelastic, it becomes obvious that the effectiveness of a cost internalization strategy can be substantiallyreduced. Since
the monopolist faces an inelastic demand for its product, any increase in
price due to an internalization of the social costs of production will have
very little effect on consumer demand.130 The increased production
costs are passed directly on to consumers, who end up paying a higher
unit price without consumming any fewer units. In this case, a costinternalization strategy with the objective of decreasing supply of the
environmentally unfriendly good is defeated. An inelastic demand for a
product produced in a competitive market will have a similar effect.
There, because demand is inelastic, the increase in costs will be passed
on to the consumer through higher prices, with the industry levels of
supply and demand remaining approximately the same.
What begs explanation is the relative paucity of regulatory initiatives
involving "demand side" regulation. The explanation lies in the myth
that the state is not, and should not be involving itself in shaping the
development of consumer tastes. Some believe that it is permissible for
the state to be implicated in developing intellectualfaculties that permit
individuals to participate in markets and in ensuring the accuracy of
information about available market choices, but no further. How we
citizens choose what we choose is somehow not to be the business of the
state.
But this proposal generates its own (and perhaps even more difficult)
set of questions that cannot, like questions about informational accuracy, be addressed through the merely mechanical process of insuring
access to accurate data. What is the "correct" set of environmental
preferences the state ought to persuade people to exhibit?What are the
covert and overt methods it should use to shape those preferences?And
ultimately, which institutions should the state endow with the responsibilities of urging such preferences and teaching such methods?
'30

Of course, if demand for the product is perfectly inelastic, an increase in price will have no
effect on the level of demand.
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The first question, of how we are to determine the "correct" set of
environmental preferences, is perhaps the most difficult. Certainly we
must acquire sufficient data on the complicated and inter-connected
environmental impacts of our behaviours to understand the biophysical
implications of what we are choosing to do. But data alone does not,
through any purely logical process, generate answers about which
preferences we ought to have. At its most extreme, what might be an
environmental good to some people might be an environmental bad to
others. One could argue, for example, that some residents of areas
experiencing long-term water shortages might support shifts in markets
that would sacrifice solid-waste reduction measures in order to conserve
water supplies. Simultaneously, urban dwellers in regions with abundant water supplies might very well be willing to trade off water
conservation in order to preserve remaining land fill sites. We are a long
way from developing the political processes and methodologies that
might be used to determine the correct set of environmentalpreferences,
those that ought to be reflected in our market and replatory
activitie~.'~'
Assuming that we have arrived at a correct set of preferences, the
second question, of what methods are effective in shaping attitudes to
these preferences for for the sake of the environmental good, is no more
easily answered than the first. Environmental acculturation is a constant, ongoing process involving learning of a kind that is all at once
direct and indirect, overt and coven, formal and informal, structured
and random, appropriate and necessary and, occasionally, inappropriate
and harmful. Such learning can take place at varying levels of consciousness, sophistication, and moral and material ethos, but, at least for
purposes of this discussion, the most valuable and socially significant
learning takes place during our continual interaction with others; composed of the responses that carry us forward in our environmental
affiliations and responsibilities. It is what eventually determines our
understanding of certain environmental expectations-those things
expected of us and those things we expect of others. Some of this
learning is formal in the sense that the other participants in our lives
(parents, teachers, mentors and institutions, such as church and school)
tell us explicitely what we should be doing in a given situation, what
response would best fit the predominant environmental ethos. A great
deal of such learning, however, is acquired in less formal ways131

To say that the process is "a social policy, pditical decision" and to delegate responsibilityto
elected representatives to make the choice In their benevolent wisdom is as naive as to have
blind and tautological fiith in the market to achieve the "right" outcome. See J.P. Kimmel,
supra, note 89 at 536.
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through our friends and family, and even through strangers. Such
learning is the sum total of our understanding of the environmental
norms, values, mores and beliefs that we, as members of our particular
groups and subgroups, will have internalized over the course of a
lifetime.
Our attitudes and responsibilities to the environment (or at least our
understanding of those responsibilities) are determined in precisely the
same manner as the determination of anything else we learn, such as the
norms of our cultures or the skills of reading and writing. Still, this is not
to suggest that we are taught these things explicitely. The process of
learning our environmental responsibilities, like the process of acquiring our cultural norms or reading and writing skills, is a process so
complex as to be effectively indes~ribable.'~~
Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that the short-term learning
of new behaviour will have the desired long-term effect (such as the
reduction of environmental harm) unless a similar change (the result of
learning) also takes place in the attitudes, values and belief systems that
ultimately determine that behaviour. In fact, there is nothing to suggest
that there could be any real and lasting behavioural change without
appeal to such overriding ideals.
And if all of that is true, the third, and ultimate, question remains to
be answered: If it is environmental beliefs, values and attitudes that must
be changed or re-learned, who will be supervising the effort to effect that
learning?T o suggest that government and other such formal manifestations of the public will are not involved in shaping attitudes, values and
belief systems would be entirely specious.133Nevertheless, we live in a
Clearly, we learn from others throu h a variety of media and from experience. We mi ht also
recognize a difference in the types oflearning which we do. Leunin askill, or set ofskiHs such
readin and writing, is quite different from learning anitu es, opinions and belie&.
~everthefes,the question might still he asked, how do we decide what we will learn, i.e. what
criteria do we use to determine which bits of the tremendous volume of information with
which we are assaulted, seemingly on a daily basis, to internalize and include?
Some of the information merely reinforces what we already know and believe, leaving aside
for the moment the question of how the echte-knowledge came to be, and some is simp1
ignored, misunderstood or not comprehended. But some of the bits are selected, procesek
accepted, internalized and become part of our total world view. Although it is clear that some
of our learning must gain the s t a m of belief based upon the source which presents it, and
perhaps the manner in which it is presented, it is equally clear that we occasionall believe
something because we simply do, with no explicit knowledge of how we came to be ieve it or
where, in ha, it first impinged upon our consciousness.
133 Our education systems, for esample, are channels of just that type of learning. It has been
su ested that the on[ reason that we send our children to school is for acculturation, with
rea%ng, writin maXematics and sciences merely acting as the vehicles throu h which the
inculcation of e dominant ideologies can be accomplished. Be that as it may, $ere is clearly
no reason to doubt that acerrain amount ofsuch learning must go on. In k t , for an institution
like aschool system, a bureaucracy ofsome complexity, to function at all efficiently there must
be some teaching of, at least, the culture of the institution. I n s o h as the institutional culture
'32
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society that espouses the tenets ofliberalism as being fundamental to our
democratic forms of government, to our respect for individual choice
and autonomy, and to our willingness to cede to each person the
responsibility of individual self-determination.
While environmental preference-shapingthrough propaganda would
seem to be a necessary and extremely effective component of marketbased environmental regulation, engaging in propaganda raises the
spectre of what Hannah Arendt and others call "the core evil-the
official determination of the truth or falsity of political opinion,"'34 and
what is, in Arendt's own words, "possibly the most important instrument of totalitarianism for dealing with the nontotalitarian
Most of us are willing to accept that children should be overtly and
explicitely taught in state-run institutions about their roles in society,
and that to be included in this teaching are those values and beliefs that
are widely considered as non-controversial, namely, altruism, cooperation, courtesy and general avoidance of evil lifestyle influences. But once
we have accomplished such learning and the years of public education
are behind us, there is something more than a little distastell about
Omellian thought-police silently invading the sanctity of our homes
armed with messages about values, ethics and beliefs.13G
Under certain circumstances, we have been willing to acknowledge
and accept the government's invading our innermost thoughts."' During times ofwar and other crises, the seemingly natural pulling together
of society leaves us vulnerable to government manipulation and propaganda, even when no effort is made to disguise it as something else.I3'
Occasionally the subject-matter will determine the acceptance of the
message.13' Governments, however, are not generally in the business of
and that of the dominant society overlap, there is a commensurately high degree of learning
going on which is designed to influence one's ideas about role, expectations, responsibilities,
rights and obligations.
1% T.H. Jackson and J.C. Jefiies, "Commercial Freespeech: EconomicDue Process and the First
Amendment", (1979) 65 Va. L. Rev. I at 39.
135 H. Arendt, The Or&mofTofaIifarianimt (New York Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, xgyx) at 42.
136 This myth, that the state can only legitimate1 control the images and ideas communicated to
children and others in need of orotection, an&e comolementarv mvrh that the state does not
and cannot be permitted to regulate the images and idAeascommbni;ated to adults lies behind
and is capmred by the Supreme Court of Canada's recent decisions surround commercial
speech, culminating in the strikin down by the Quebec Superior Courr of the federal
government's legislative ban on to acco advertising. See A. Hutchinson, "Money Talk
Against Constitutionalizing (Commercial) Speech", (1990) 17 C.B.L.J. 2.
137 At least in oven Fashion. That it goes on covertly, all the time according to many commentators, is quite another question.
138 De ending to a large &tent on the general popularity of the cause or the severity of the crisis
a n l t h e empathy which can be generated thereby.
139 The Participaction program, s onsored by the federal government, has enjoyed henomenal
success during its rwenty year !fapan and has gone almost completely unremar ed by those
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attacking the status quo, not generally in the business of persuading
people against purchasing legally available products.
Yet if this is true, if the government is an inappropriate messenger in
the minds of most, what then is our alternative? Are environmental
groups, in their enormous diversity, more suitable?Due in part to years
of dis-empowerment in the hce of serious environmental crises, environmental groups, although serving an important if not vital role, often
lack the stature and credibility (not to mention the resources) necessary
to mount continuous programs of public education. Nevertheless, I'f one
is convinced that environmental advocacy groups are the most appropriate messengers, which group or groups should be chosen?Earth First?140
But if not to governments and ifnot to environmentalists, are we then
to cede responsibility for environmental acculturalization to private
industry? Despite the conceptual allure of the somewhat romantic,
somewhat stylized vision of human learning presented above, it is
increasingly clear that the most insidiousand effective learninglteaching
dynamic at work on the continent of North America is of the type
initiated by the various forms of mass media, that is, advertising in
general and television, radio, newspaper and magazine advertising in
paticular."'
for whom a natural inclination to distrust everything said by Ottawawould seem to make it a
articularlyvulnerable target. Clearly a mandate to suggest that good health throu h an active
Efestyle, rather than being sub-em to unFavourable comparisons to sixty year 01 Swedes, is
considerably less controversial than a scheme designed to revise patterns and habits of
consumption learned over a lifetime and which would result in a lessening, in many cases, of
comforr, leisure and convenience.
O t h First! is a radical environmental group, advocating not only passive civil disobedience,
but active acts of industrial sabotage. See ' Radical Group suspected in British Columbia",
VancorrverSun (zo September 1991) AI and D.Foreman, Ecodejience:A Fiekf Guide to Monkey
Wrenching (Tuscon: Ned Ludd Bks., 1987).
There is no denying that the media, articularly that part of the media made up of advertisers
devoted to sellin not only products ut lifestyles carrying the stamp of approval of corporate
~ o r t ~merica,
h
kave devoted tremendous amounts of time and effort, not to mention money,
in learning how to affect the attitudes, belie& and value tems of those exposed to their
messages. The reason should be clear. Consumers who have ought the value system, will buy
the product by which it is represented. Consequently, the underlying message in most ofwhat
we watch is that consuming is good, not bad.
B.H. Bagdikian states at 142in "Dr. Brandreth Has Gone to Harvard" in TheMediaMonopoly
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1983)~
At one time or another, advenisers have mcces@Uy demanded that the following ideas
appear in programs around their ads.
All businessmen are good or, if not, are always condemned b other businessmen. All
wan are humane. The status quo is wonderful. Also wondertf; are all grocery stores,
bakeries, drug companies, restaurants, and laundries. Religionists, especially clergy, are
perfect. All users of cigarettes are gentle, graceful, healthy, youthful people. In Fact, anyone
who uses a tobacco product is a hero. People who commit suicide never do it with pills. All
financial institutions are always in good
- shape. The American way of life is beyond
criticism.
The above messages, to cite only a few, are not vague inferences. Major advertisers
insisted, successllly, that these specific ideas be expressed not in the ads but in the
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The liberal vision of various independent groups struggling on, in
good faith, in complicated but earnest dialogues with public and private
sectors in endeavouringto merge and render into reality our societal and
environmental ideals cannot be reconciled with the conflicting visions
of the despotic governments, radical environmentalist fictions and
rapacious entrepreneurs I have alluded to. But can we do nothing at all?
The intractable questions of the "right" set of consumer preferences for
the environment, of the ways in which we want to shape those preferences, and of the identities of the institutions we think we should
employ to perform the task of preference-shaping cannot be answered
here. Most disturbing is that far too few of us are trying to think about
these questions at all.
VII. EPILOGUE
Returning briefly to our example of the unjust society and reference
about a world that is peopled not with cynics or masochists but with
people as they generally are, the point to be emphasized is that we must
believe that either "the injustices are en route to being amended, or that
they are counterbalanced by greater benefits, or that they are inevitable,
or that they are not really injustices at all."'42 In substituting the words
"environmental damage" for injustices we immediately realize that this
is very much the way Western societies have tended to view the problem
of ecb~o~ical
destruction. Given our naive belief in the imrno;tality of
the species and the rightness of our continued technological progress, is
it any wonder that we continue to do the very things that will cause the
most damage to our environment and do the most harm to ourselves?
Consider our many outlooks and the ways we rationalize them. Environmental damage will eventually be fixed, someday, by somebody.
Environmental damage and its costs are outweighed by the benefits of a
greater economic good. Environmental damage is inevitable simply
because there are too many people for too few resources. Environmental
harm is merely a myth caused by environmentalist fringe groups'
overreacting, crying wolf. Reasoning along any of these lines unfortunately not only fails to inspire people to take responsibility, it hrther
serves to reinforce and perpetuate that failure. We then end up either
leaving it to others-generally those possessed of greater expertise, skill
and learning-to fix things for us, or consoling ourselves with hopelll
ostensibly 'independent' news reporting, editorial content, or entertainment programs of
newspapers,
- - magazines, radio, and television.
142 T. Eagleton, mpra, note 115 at 27.
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calculations of economic benefit over environmental detriment. Or
fatalistically separating ourselves from the possibility of any workable
solution. Or worse, blinding ourselves to our very desperate need for
one.
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